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Formalism and Realism in
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Barry Cushmant
This Article attempts a reconceptualization of developments in Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence between the Civil War and World War II by identifying ways in which that jurisprudence was
structurally related to and accordingly deeply influenced by the categories of substantive due proc-
ess and dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Antecedent dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence set the terms within which Commerce Clause doctrine was worked out; coordinate develop-
ments in substantive due process doctrine set limits upon the scope of Commerce Clause formula-
tions and thus played a critical and underappreciated role in maintaining the federal equilibrium.
The subsequent erosion of those due process limitations vastly expanded federal power and
prompted a crisis in Commerce Clause jurisprudence that was ultimately resolved by adoption of a
political process approach to both affirmative and dormant Commerce Clause adjudication. The
categories that had unified affirmative and dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence were aban-
doned, decoupling the two lines of doctrine and rendering them no longer developmentally inter-
dependent. The two lines went their separate ways, economic substantive due process disappeared,
and the enterprise of interdoctrinal coordination that had held a vast body of constitutional law to-
gether was lost to history.
We continue to study the development of these lines of doctrine in our Constitutional Law
curricula, but we do so in an ahistorical manner that obscures understanding. We study the devel-
opment of doctrine topically rather than synchronically, wresting lines of doctrine from the related
doctrinal contexts in which they developed. Such decontextualization, in this case as in others, is a
surefire method of making the entire undertaking look preposterous. Looking back at this juris-
prudence from the vantage and through the categories of our contemporary constitutional sensibil-
ity, it becomes difficult to understand how any intelligent person could ever have taken the enter-
prise seriously. Yet a very great many clearly did. This piece seeks to understand why and how that
could have been, while at the same time explaining why the enterprise unraveled in the way it did
when it did. What emerges; I hope, is a new way of thinking and teaching about constitutional de-
velopment in this critical period.
INTRODUCTION
Exegesis of the principal Commerce Clause cases decided by the
Supreme Court between 1895 and 1942 typically proceeds with the aid
of two rough and ready organizational rubrics: "formalism" and "real-
ism." As one leading casebook puts it, "The cases invoked two general
approaches. Under the formal approach, the Court examined the stat-
ute and the regulated activity to determine whether certain objective
criteria are satisfied.... In contrast, the realist approach attempted to
determine the actual economic impact of the regulation."' Formalism
t Elizabeth D. & Richard A. Merrill Research Professor, University of Virginia School of
Law. Thanks to Patrice Cushman, Joel Goldstein, John C. Harrison, Roderick Hills, Michael
Klarman, Daryl Levinson, Charles McCurdy, Mark Tushnet, and G. Edward White for helpful
comments, and to Jason Tilly, Scott Matthews, and Charles Stormont for valuable research assis-
tance.
1 Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, Constitutional Law 195 (Aspen 3d ed 1996). Though my treat-
ment of the Stone text's handling of these cases is often critical, I should disclose that I use and
in most other respects admire the casebook.
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required that the relationship between the local activity and interstate
commerce be "formal" and "logical," while the more "pragmatic" real-
ism focused on the "realistic," "practical," "empirical" economic im-
pact.
The exemplar of the formalist approach is United States v E.C.
Knight Co, in which the Court rejected a Sherman Act challenge to a
transaction through which the American Sugar Refining Company
had acquired four independent refineries and thereby secured control
over 98 percent of the refining capacity in the country. In a lonely dis-
sent, Justice Harlan bemoaned the economic consequences that such
mergers held for consumers in the interstate market, but the majority
would have none of it.4 Federal authority did not extend to the control
of corporate consolidation in the manufacturing sector, the Court
held. Congress had power to regulate commerce among the several
states, but not domestic concerns such as mining, agriculture, and
manufacturing. Such activities affected interstate commerce, to be
sure, but they did so only "indirectly." "Commerce succeeds to manu-
facture," wrote Chief Justice Fuller, "and is not part of it."
The principal illustrations of the contrasting "realist" approach
are the Shreveport Rate Case6 and the "stream of commerce" cases. In
Shreveport, the Court upheld federal regulation of rates for rail trans-
port between points within a state-what appeared to be a purely "lo-
cal" activity-on the ground that they bore a "close and substantial"
relationship to interstate commerce. The Justices similarly approved
congressional supervision of "local" transactions in public stockyards
because they were located in a "current" or "stream" of interstate
commerce.
2 See, for example, id at 198,213,226; Gerald Gunther and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitu-
tional Law 163, 165-66, 168, 185 (Foundation 1997). Here and throughout this article I use the
terms "formalism" and "realism" as they are used in the sources cited, without any attempt fur-
ther to define or defend them.
3 156 US 1 (1895).
4 Id at 21-23.
5 Id at 12. The definitive study locating the Knight decision in its immediate jurispruden-
tial context is Charles McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of
American Corporation Law, 1869-1903,53 Bus Hist Rev 304 (1979) (arguing that the Sherman
Act was framed and Knight decided against a backdrop of an established regime of state control
of corporate consolidation in the manufacturing sector). Compare Edward Corwin, The Com-
merce Power versus States Rights 156 (Princeton 1936) ("[Tlhe term 'indirect' in this context is a
mere device, a formula pulled out of the judicial hat").
6 Houston, East and West Texas Railway Co v United States, 234 US 342 (1914).
7 Id at 351.
8 See Tagg Brothers & Moorhead v United States, 280 US 420,436-37 (1930) (permitting
regulation of livestock market agencies); Stafford v Wallace, 258 US 495,519 (1922) (permitting
Congress to regulate transaction fees charged by intrastate packers and market agents); Swift
and Co v United States, 196 US 375 (1905) (approving the application of the Sherman Act to in-
trastate livestock traders). See also Chicago Board of Trade v Olsen, 262 US 1, 33 (1923) (Rely-
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The fact that the Court as an institution and the Justices individu-
ally simultaneously embraced two such disparate modes of analyzing
questions of federal power presents an interesting question in judicial
psychology. How could any serious legal thinker have uttered the
"formalistic" nostra of Knight and Carter Coal' out of one side of his
mouth while at the same time advocating such "realistic," "practical"
approaches out of the other? Diagnoses might run the gamut from
cognitive dissonance to schizophrenia, but the apparent tension be-
tween the two intellectual styles would in any event suggest some sort
of affliction.
Scholars have traditionally resolved this tension by asserting that
those who mouthed these formulations had no serious intellectual
commitment to them whatsoever. For more than two generations
leading constitutional commentators have concurred with pro-
nouncements like Edward Corwin's in 1941:
[P]rior to the New Deal [the Court's] conceptualistic equipment
in the field of constitutional law was often such that the Cdurt
was able to translate into juridical idiom almost any result which
it might decide to be for the best interest of the country; and [ ]
this was definitely the situation when the issue of constitutional-
ity arose on the "commerce" clause. '°
Benjamin Wright agreed that "with the multiplication of judicial
interpretations, there has developed a great body of constitutional law
which constitutes a stock-pile from which the Court can draw mean-
ings as the need arises .... They are so varied as to give to the artisan a
broad range of discretion" and concluded that the Commerce Clause
decisions of the 1930s "were dictated not by the Constitution but by
the economic and political philosophy of the Justices."" Robert
McCloskey, in his classic work, The American Supreme Court, main-
tained that
the Constitution forbids those departures from laissez-faire that
the Court disapproves, and permits those departures that the
Court thinks reasonable and proper. And obviously this is not a
legal "rule" in any understandable sense of the word, but a
statement of social policy, or rather an assertion of the power to
ing on Stafford, the Court upheld the Grain Futures Act of Sept 21,1922, Pub L No 331, 42 Stat
998, regulating grain stored temporarily in the Chicago market before being shipped to other
states and foreign countries.).
9 Carter v Carter Coal Co, 298 US 238,307 (1936) (invalidating provisions of the Bitumi-
nous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 in part on the ground that they sought to regulate the "lo-
cal" activity of coal mining, which affected interstate commerce only "indirectly").
10 Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. 34 (Claremont 1941).
11 Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law 197-99 (Chicago
1942).
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determine it. Under these loose standards the Court can either
uphold or overthrow almost any commercial regulation it en-
counters, depending on whether the judges approve or disap-
prove the economic policy the law represents.2
A legion of other scholars has followed the lead of these giants,3 and
their vision dominates our understanding of Commerce Clause devel-
opment to this day.
Consider, for example, the narrative woven by a leading case-
book. It suggests that the Court failed to develop "commerce power
doctrine of adequate integrity during the pre-1937 era."' Instead, "the
Court pursued a wavering course, from the restrictive interpretation
of Knight to the more generous one of Shreveport."'' "The doctrinal
approaches of these cases cast significant, and often contradictory,
shadows over subsequent litigation. Thus, when New Deal laws came
before the Court in the 1930s, the differing progeny of the Knight and
Shreveport cases offered the Justices a choice of standards."'' 6 "Cases
such as Shreveport were encouraging; yet cases like Knight looked the
other way. Would the New Deal measures survive judicial scrutiny?
There could be no certainty, for 'there was ample authority in the Su-
preme Court opinions looking both ways.""7 "The logical nexus, 'di-
rect-indirect' emphasis of Knight ... [left] a legacy of doctrine capable
of being invoked in other contexts; and 'that legacy proved decisive in
the early New Deal cases.""' "Until 1936, the Court drew mainly on the
Knight heritage and invalidated major national laws."' 9 "But then, just
a year later, in the wake of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Court-packing
12 Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 149-50 (Chicago 1960).
13 See, for example, Paul R. Benson, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Commerce Clause;
1937-1970 64 (Dunellen 1970) (The direct-indirect formula was "in fact a highly subjective test
under which the justices retained wide discretion to base decisions on their personal social and
economic philosophies."); Richard Cortner, The Jones & Laughlin Case 48 (Arizona 1970); Al-
fred Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, The American Constitution 736, 745-46 (Norton 4th ed
1970) (discussing the Justices' laissez-faire sympathies); Alpheus Thomas Mason and William M.
Beaney, The Supreme Court in a Free Society 94-95,156-61 (Norton rev ed 1968) (describing the
Court as utilizing legal tools to achieve economic ends); Richard Cortner, The Wagner Act Cases
184 (Tenn 1964) (characterizing early Commerce Clause cases as result-driven and difficult to
reconcile); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval 458-67 (Houghton Mifflin 1960);
Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren vii-ix, 38,123 (LSU 1958) (de-
scribing the era as "judicial mayhem"); Samuel Hendel, Charles Evans Hughes and the Supreme
Court 63 (King's Crown 1951) ("[C]onceptions of the practical and beneficial, unconscious or
avowed, rather than abstract doctrine furnish the surest explanation of the disagreements of the
Justices.").
14 Gunther and Sullivan, Constitutional Law at 171 (cited in note 2).
15 Id at 169.
16 Id at 163.
17 Id at 177, citing Robert Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-
1946,59 Harv L Rev 645,646 (1946).
18 Gunther and Sullivan, Constitutional Law at 163-64 (cited in note 2).
19 Id at 163.
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plan of 1937, the Court became more receptive to national economic
regulation: the Shreveport heritage was invoked to provide support
for that new constitutional direction."' "[B]eginning with 1937, the
Shreveport approach, more receptive to expansive congressional uses
of the commerce power, became central.,,21 "[T]he analyses of Shreve-
port and other railroad cases were to provide useful constitutional
underpinnings for the Court's increasingly benign attitude toward na-
tional economic regulation that began in 1937." And then a conclud-
ing rhetorical question: "Can any of the decisions be justified as 'prin-
cipled'-as a decision that rests on 'reasons that in their generality and
their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved'? Or
were those decisions simply willful fiats by a Court majority hostile to
reform, as many New Deal critics charged? '
The conventional presentation of the Court's Commerce Clause
decisions thus suggests that the Justices were at best jurisprudentially
disoriented and at worst cynically opportunistic. As an alternative to
these dark diagnoses, this Article offers the hypothesis that the com-
mitments evidenced by these apparently competing lines of authority
were actually parts of an integrated structure of thought and doctrine.
Exploration of the common features of these two traditions may help
us to understand how they could have been held in the same mind si-
multaneously. Such an examination will also assist us in understanding
how the "realist" tradition gained preeminence in the late 1930s, and
why both traditions fell into desuetude shortly thereafter.
20 Id at 164.
21 Id at 163.
22 Id at 166.
23 Id at 178.To similar effect is Stone, et al, Constitutional Law at 205 (cited in note 1):
Does the Court's record from the 1880s to the 1920s on the issues considered here reflect
(a) a principled effort to develop a coherent body of law in an area where determining ap-
propriate doctrine is difficult; (b) an unprincipled effort to uphold laws that enough justices
thought wise and to strike down those they thought unwise; (c) an effort to ensure that
Congress attend to considerations of federalism by developing a doctrinal repertoire that
allowed the Court occasionally to hold a statute unconstitutional? ... Whatever the Court's
intentions, by 1930 it had at hand a group of precedents that gave it substantial flexibility in
assessing the constitutionality of Congress's efforts to regulate the economy.
See also William Cohen and Jonathan D.Varat, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 184-85
(Foundation 10th ed 1997): "[F]rom the beginning of significant congressional regulation of the
incidents of nationwide transportation systems and industrial production until 1936, the Court
adopted a variety of approaches simultaneously to limit perceived excesses of the commerce
power and approve perceived needful uses."
This interpretation of the Court's Commerce Clause doctrine during this era is substantially
embraced by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 570-74
(1995) (noting the instability of prior Court attempts to distinguish among congressional regula-
tions of the national market), which Cohen and Varat reprint in lieu of narrative exposition. See
Cohen and Varat, Constitutional Law at 185-90.
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates the Court's "for-
malist" affirmative Commerce Clause decisions in the context of the
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence from which they emerged,
and shows how the categories comprising that jurisprudence served
important practical goals. Part II locates the Court's "realist" affirma-
tive Commerce Clause decisions in the substantive due process con-
text in which they operated, and shows how "formalist" due process
doctrine constrained "realist" Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Part
III examines the crisis in Commerce Clause doctrine brought on by
the breakdown of these "formalist" due process restraints. Part IV de-
tails the manner in which the Court resolved this crisis by reconstruct-
ing both dormant and affirmative Commerce Clause doctrine within
new conceptual frameworks that cast aside the categories and meth-
ods of "formalism" and "realism."
I. SOME REALISM ABOUT FORMALISM
A. Formalism and Principle
First impressions are important. One's first encounter with the
distinctions between production and commerce and between direct
and indirect effects is usually the Knight opinion," in which the Court
denied the federal government power to abate a monopolistic combi-
nation in the manufacturing sector. Read next to Justice Harlan's sen-
sible dissent, the majority opinion appears artificial, wooden, even silly
and irresponsible. The need to recognize "the independence of the
commercial power and of the police power, and the delimitation be-
tween them"" Justice Harlan was prepared to concede.2' But he could
not assent to a "rigid, technical and narrow"' interpretation of the
Commerce Clause that placed the federal government "in such a con-
dition of helplessness that it must fold its arms and remain inactive
while capital combine[d] ... to destroy competition ... throughout the
entire country in the buying and selling of ... the necessaries of life. '
Yet first impressions can be misleading. As Gunther and Sullivan
acknowledge, "The logical nexus, 'direct-indirect' emphasis of Knight,
it turned out, did not prove a significant barrier to application of the
antitrust laws."' For instance, the Court repeatedly sustained applica-
tions of the Sherman Act to interstate railway companies, which were
24 156 US at 1.
25 Id at 13.
26 Id at 18,19 (Harlan dissenting).
27 Id at 19.
28 Id at43.
29 Gunther and Sullivan, Constitutional Law at 163 (cited in note 2).
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"instruments of commerce, and their business is commerce itsel"O
Such enterprises, engaged in interstate transportation rather than local
production, fell on the national side of the local/national dichotomy.
Moreover, the Knight majority had opined that "buying and sell-
ing and the transportation incident thereto constitute commerce."
31
This position was elaborated in Addyston Pipe," where the majority
opinion noted:
Where the contract is for the sale of the article and for its deliv-
ery in another State, the transaction is one of interstate com-
merce, although the vendor may have also agreed to manufacture
it in order to fulfil his contract of sale. In such case a combination
of this character would be properly called a combination in re-
straint of interstate commerce, and not one relating only to
manufacture.3
Finding that the pooling agreement of six iron pipe manufactures in-
volved "contracts for the sale and transportation to other States of
specific articles,"' the Court unanimously sustained the government's
challenge to the combination's legality. "It is the sale and delivery, of a
certain kind and quality of pipe," wrote Justice Peckham, "and not the
manufacture, which is the material portion of the contract, and a sale
for delivery beyond the State makes the transaction a part of inter-
state commerce."35
The Knight Court rested its decision on the absence of evidence
that the company intended to restrain interstate commerce. "There
was nothing in the proofs," Fuller wrote, "to indicate any intention to
put a restraint upon trade or commerce, and the fact, as we have seen,
that trade or commerce might be indirectly affected was not enough
to entitle complainants to a decree." The implication was of course
30 Northern Securities Co v United States, 193 US 197,353 (1904). See, for example, United
States v Joint Traffic Association, 171 US 505, 568-70 (1898) (invalidating a rate-setting agree-
ment among railroads); United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 US 290 (1897)
(invalidating another agreement to set intrastate rates). For additional railroad antitrust cases,
see Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 Va L Rev 559,630 n 78 (1997).
31 156 US at 14.
32 Addyston Pipe and Steel Co v United States, 175 US 211 (1899).
33 Id at 246.
34 Id at 240.
35 Id at 242. See also Continental Wall Paper Co v Louis Voight and Sons Co, 212 US 227,
264-65 (1909) (holding that part of agreement that regarded interstate sales brought whole
agreement within interstate commerce); Montague & Co v Lowry, 193 US 38, 45-46 (1904)
(holding that tiles that were to be shipped out-of-state constituted objects of interstate com-
merce).
36 Knight, 156 US at 17. "The object was manifestly private gain in the manufacture of the
commodity, but not through the control of interstate or foreign commerce .... [I]t does not follow
that an attempt to monopolize, or the actual monopoly ot the manufacture was an attempt,
whether executory or consummated, to monopolize commerce.... Id (emphasis added). The
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that the case would have been decided differently had intent been
shown. And, indeed, when such intent was proven in subsequent cases
such as Standard Oil Co v United States3 and United States v American
Tobacco Co,- the Court did not hesitate to find the Sherman Act ap-
plicable. In fact, the government and private plaintiffs enjoyed consid-
erable success before the Court in their attempts to control the behav-
ior of corporate giants with the federal antitrust laws.9
The Stone, et al, text, by contrast, offers no similar acknowledg-
ment that the Court ever recognized federal authority in business an-
titrust cases. The notes following Knight immediately introduce the
second Coronado Coal case, in which the Court held that the
Sherman Act applied to a labor strike against mine operators." The
text observes that the Court distinguished Coronado Coal from
Knight in Carter v Carter Coal,4' in which the Court struck down provi-
sions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 conferring
upon the employees of coal producers the right to bargain collectively.
The distinction drawn was that in Coronado Coal, "The acts of the
persons involved were local in character, but the intent was to restrain
interstate commerce, and the means employed were calculated to
carry that intent into effect. Interstate commerce was the direct object
of attack; and the restraint of such commerce was the necessary con-
sequence of the acts and the immediate end in view."4'3 Reduction in
the supply of a good was "ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruc-
tion" of interstate commerce, but "when the intent ... [was] to restrain
or control the supply" of a good in interstate commerce, the Sherman
Act applied." The text then asks whether the distinction between
Knight and Coronado Coal is "intelligible,"4' whether Carter Coal "ef-
restraint on commerce imposed by a combination in manufacturing, mining, or agriculture
"would be an indirect result, however inevitable and whatever its extent, and such result would
not necessarily determine the object of the contract, combination, or conspiracy." Id at 16 (em-
phasis added). "[Tlhe truth is," wrote William Howard Taft in The Anti-Trust Act and the Su-
preme Court (Harper 1914), "the case for the Government was not well prepared at the circuit.
No direct evidence that the sales of sugar across State lines, and the control of the business of
such sales and of prices, were the chief object of the combination was submitted to the Court." Id
at 59.
37 221 US 1,74-77 (1911) (finding an intent to control the national oil market).
38 221 US 106, 181-83 (1911) (holding that a combination sought to monopolize the na-
tional tobacco market).
39 For a sample of such success stories between 1911 and 1940, see Cushman, 83 Va L Rev
at 628-30 nn 77-80 (cited in note 30).
40 Coronado Coal Co v United Mine Workers, 268 US 295 (1925) ("Coronado Coal IT').
41 Id at 310.
42 298 US 238 (1936).
43 Id at 304.
44 Coronado Coal 11, 268 US at 310.
45 Stone, et al, Constitutional Law at 198 (cited in note 1).
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fectively distinguish[ed] Coronado Coal," and "[iln light of Coronado
Coal, did the Court over the period from 1890 to 1930 have and use a
coherent notion of 'good' versus 'bad' regulation?"7 Juxtaposing only
Knight, Coronado Coal and Carter Coal, it would be the extraordinary
student who could manage anything other than a power guffaw in re-
sponse. Obviously, the Court opportunistically manipulated a pile of
transparently result-oriented mumbo-jumbo in order to line the pock-
ets of corporate fat cats while putting the screws to organized labor.
A different response might be elicited, however, were the reader
aware of the existence of labor case analogues to Knight. Coronado
Coal had first come before the Court in 1922. Remarking that "[c]oalmining is not interstate commerce, and the power of Congress does
not extend to its regulation as such," the Court unanimously reversed
the Sherman Act judgment against the union. Listen to the echoes of
Knight in the opinion of Chief Justice Taft:
"The making of goods and the mining of coal are not commerce,
nor does the fact that these things are to be afterwards shipped
or used in interstate commerce, make their production a part
thereof." Obstruction to coal mining is not a direct obstruction to
interstate commerce in coal, although it, of course, may affect it
by reducing the amount of coal to be carried in that commerce."
In order for the Sherman Act to apply, the Court held, "the intent to
injure, obstruct or restrain interstate commerce must appear as an ob-
vious consequence of what is to be done, or shown by direct evidence
or other circumstances."'' Here the coal operators had produced no
such evidence of intent, and the strike was therefore a local matter
outside the federal regulatory bailiwick."
United Leather Workers International Union v Herkert & Meisel
Trunk Co, 5 decided in 1924, is to the same effect. The union, seeking
to obtain a closed shop agreement, had engaged in a strike that con-
cededly was aimed at preventing the manufacture of goods that would
have been transported in interstate commerce. The company, however,
46 Id at 213.
47 Id at 199.
48 United Mine Workers v Coronado Coal Co, 259 US 344, 407 (1922) ("Coronado
Coal F').
49 Id at 408, quoting in part Hammer v Dagenhart, 247 US 251,272 (1918).
50 Coronado Coal 1, 259 US at 408.
51 Id at 407-13. See Stanley I. Kutler, Chief Justice Taft, Judicial Unanimity and Labor: The
Coronado Case, 24 The Historian 68,72-74 (1961) (indicating that the debate within the Court
was over the purpose of the alleged conspiracy). See also Alexander M. Bickel, Unpublished
Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis 77-99 (Belknap 1957) (discussing Justice Brandeis's draft dis-
senting opinion in Coronado 1, in which he argued that the purpose of the conduct was to re-
strain only the intrastate activity of mining coal).
52 265 US 457 (1924).
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produced no evidence that the striking workers had tried to interfere
with the sale or transport of the goods once they had been manufac-
tured."' Simply hoping that a decline in sales would bring management
around did not render the union subject to Sherman Act discipline.
Nor did it matter that the workers had engaged in acts of illegal pick-
eting and intimidation in order to achieve their aim. Again employing
the Knight categories, the Court unanimously rebuffed the company's
claim.
[T]he mere reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped in
interstate commerce, by the illegal or tortious prevention of its
manufacture, is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction to
that commerce. It is only when the intent or necessary effect
upon such commerce in the article is to enable those preventing
the manufacture to monopolize the supply, control its price or
discriminate as between its would-be purchasers, that the unlaw-
ful interference with its manufacture can be said directly to bur-
den interstate commerce.'
A third case, this one decided in 1933, again illustrates the Court's
persistent, principled adherence to the Knight formulation. In Lever-
ing & Garrigues Co v Morrin," the Court unanimously refused to en-
join a boycott for a closed shop at a company engaged in the business
of fabricating and erecting structural steel for shipment in interstate
commerce. The boycott may have reduced or eradicated the com-
pany's interstate business, but that was just tough luck. Again focusing
on the question of intent, the Court found that "the sole aim of the
conspiracy was to halt or suppress local building operations as a
means of compelling the employment of union labor, not for the pur-
pose of affecting the sale or transit of materials in interstate com-
merce."57 The Court continued:
Use of the materials was purely a local matter, and the suppres-
sion thereof the result of the pursuit of a purely local aim. Re-
straint of interstate commerce was not an object of the conspir-
acy.... Prevention of the local use was in no sense a means
adopted to effect such a restraint. It is this exclusively local aim,
and not the fortuitous and incidental effect on interstate com-
merce, which gives character to the conspiracy. If thereby the
53 Id at 464.
54 Id at 471.
55 289 US 103 (1933).
56 Id at 106-07.
57 Id at 107.
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shipment of steel in interstate commerce was curtailed, that re-
sult was incidental, indirect and remote.-%
These were of course not the remarks of a Court in the pocket of
organized labor. Conservative justices felt the pinch of "formalism."
As Taft put it in his first Coronado Coal opinion, "[T]he circumstances
[which involved homicide and arson] are such as to awaken regret
that, in our view of the federal jurisdiction, we cannot affirm the
judgment. But it is of far higher importance that we should preserve
inviolate the fundamental limitations in respect to the federal jurisdic-
tion.", , Justice Day, the author of Hammer v DagenhartP wrote on his
return of Taft's circulated opinion, "I agree, and regret that this gross
outrage by the local union cannot be reached by federal authority.""
Justice McReynolds was more blunt. On his return of the opinion he
wrote simply, "I am sorry you can't make the scoundrels pay."""
B. Formalism as Consequentialism
1. Preserving federalism.
But the fact that the categories of "formalism" were deployed in
a more evenhanded fashion than we have been prepared to recognize
will not alone rebut the charge that "formalism" was a peculiarly
mindless form of nominalism. 3 For this it is necessary to recognize
that "formalism" was itself rooted in consequentialist concerns. There
are two senses in which such a claim might be made for formalism.
First, the division of the world into local and national spheres-
placing manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and other productive in-
dustry in the local sphere, while locating interstate transportation, as
well as sales and negotiations of sales for subsequent interstate ship-
ment, in the national-was itself a conscious strategy for circumscrib-
ing the boundaries of national and local competence in a principled
fashion. Justice Cardozo would later suggest in his Schechter concur-
rence"' (and Chief Justice Hughes would agree in his opinion for the
Court in Jones & Laughlin)o that the Justices should make case-by-
58 Id.
59 Coronado Coal 1, 259 US at 413.
60 247 US 251 (1918) (striking down a regulation prohibiting the shipment in interstate
commerce of goods manufactured by child labor).
61 Papers of William Howard Taft, Reel 615.
62 Id. On his return Justice Pitney remarked wryly, "Too true to be good." Id.
63 Here I use the term "nominalism" to denote a preoccupation with the name; for exam-
ple, "manufacturing" of the activity regulated, rather than the consequences of the activity or its
regulation.
64 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495,554 (1935) ("The law is not
indifferent to considerations of degree.").
6S NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1, 37 (1937) ("The question [of effect on
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case calls concerning whether a local activity affected interstate com-
merce sufficiently to warrant federal regulation. Whether anything
that could be called a rule of law could emerge from such an enter-
prise is an interesting question; the Court so quickly abandoned this
approach that we may never know the answer.6 But the Justices of the
"formalist" period clearly thought not, as their insistence on reasoning
in a "parade of horribles" style made clear. Listen again to Knight:
If it be held that the term [commerce] includes the regulation of
all such manufactures as are intended to be the subject of com-
mercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it
would also include all productive industries that contemplate the
same thing. The result would be that Congress would be invested,
to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate, not only
manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising,
domestic fisheries, mining-in short, every branch of human in-
dustry.'
That is, there would be no principled point at which to draw the line
beyond which federal authority might not venture. Federal power
would perforce be plenary. A situation "less likely to have been what
the framers of the Constitution intended," Fuller maintained, "would
be difficult to imagine."'
This view was reiterated in Schechter by the author of Shreveport
himself Defending the distinction between direct and indirect effects
on commerce, Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises
and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect
upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would embrace
practically all the activities of the people and the authority of the
State over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance
of the federal government."'
The Government's argument in favor of the Live Poultry Code's regu-
lation of wages and hours in local slaughterhouses, Hughes main-
tained,
proves too much. If the federal government may determine the
wages and hours of employees in the internal commerce of a
State, because of their relation to cost and prices and their indi-
rect effect upon interstate commerce, it would seem that a similar
interstate commerce] is necessarily one of degree.").
66 See Part IV.
67 156 US at 14-15, quoting Kidd v Pearson, 128 US 1, 21 (1888).
68 156 US at 15, quoting Kidd, 128 US at 22.
69 Schechter Poultry, 295 US at 546.
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control might be exerted over other elements of cost, also affect-
ing prices, such as the number of employees, rents, advertising,
methods of doing business, etc. All the processes of production
and distribution that enter into cost could likewise be controlled.
If the cost of doing an intrastate business is in itself the permitted
object of federal control, the extent of the regulation of cost
would be a question of discretion and not of power."
"It is not the province of the Court to consider the economic advan-
tages or disadvantages of such a centralized system," Hughes con-
cluded. "It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not
provide for it.,'
7'
2. Promoting free trade while preserving the powers to tax
and regulate.
But the Justices who had forged the categories to which Hughes
and his colleagues would later cling had in fact considered the eco-
nomic advantages and disadvantages of such a centralized system, and
this brings us to the second sense in which "formalism" was itself a
consequentialist jurisprudence. In the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, the central question in constitutional federalism was
not the extent to which the Commerce Clause empowered Congress
to regulate local activities. It was instead the degree to which the
"negative implications" of that clause limited the regulatory authority
of state and local governments.7 As the national economy became in-
creasingly integrated in the years following the Civil War, the Court
began a conscious and increasingly aggressive campaign to break
down local barriers to interstate trade through a "free-trade" con-
struction of the dormant Commerce Clause.? In the process the Court
70 Id at 549.
71 Id.
72 A fact abundantly illustrated by a review of the Commerce Clause treatise literature of
the period, in which treatments of dormant Commerce Clause decisions simply dwarf corre-
sponding exegesis of affirmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See, for example, F.D.G. Rib-
ble, State and National Power Over Commerce (Columbia 1937); Bernard C. Gavit, The Com-
merce Clause (Principia 1932); Frederick N. Judson, The Law of Interstate Commerce and Its Fed-
eral Regulation (T.H. Flood 2d ed 1912); Frederick H. Cooke, The Commerce Clause (Baker
1908); Thomas H. Calvert, Regulation of Commerce under the Federal Constitution (Thompson
1907); Paul Jones, The Commercial Power of Congress (1904); E. Parmalee Prentice and John G.
Egan, The Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution (Callaghan 1898); William Draper Lewis,
The Federal Power over Commerce and Its Effects on State Action (Pennsylvania 1892).
73 "[P]owerful economic forces ... [i]ndustrialization and improvement in transportation
facilities, with an accompanying extension of trade horizons, demanded the freedom from state
regulation of commerce... " The "effect was to cause [the] grant of power to be interpreted as
generally exclusive by the Supreme Court" Joseph E. Kallenbach, Federal Cooperation with the
States under the Commerce Clause 31 (Greenwood 1968).
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substantially curtailed such time-honored local regulations 7  as dis-
criminatory license taxes on those selling out-of-state goods7 5 and dis-
criminatory taxes on the out-of-state goods themselves.' 6 "In granting
to Congress the right to regulate commerce ... among the several
States," Justice Miller explained, "the framers of the Constitution be-
lieved that they had sufficiently guarded against the dangers of any
taxation by the States which would interfere with the freest interchange
of commodities among the people of the different States." Upholding
such discriminatory taxation would lead to "a total abolition of all
commercial intercourse between the States."'78 The Constitution "had
its immediate origin in the necessities of commerce; and for its imme-
diate object ... establishing a uniform and steady system.''n Such pro-
tectionist legislation, wrote Justice Harlan,
if maintained by this court, would ultimately bring our commerce
to that "oppressed and degraded state," existing at the adoption
of the present Constitution, when the helpless, inadequate Con-
federation was abandoned and a national government instituted.
... The concession of such a power to the State would render
wholly nugatory all national control of commerce among the
States, and place the trade and business of the country at the
74 See Charles Fairman, 7 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction
and Reunion, 1864-88, Part H 666 (New York 1987); McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision at
309-11 (cited in note 5).
75 See, for example, Bethlehem Motors Corp v Flynt, 256 US 421,426-27 (1921) (invalidat-
ing a state licensing requirement that disproportionately burdened dealers in automobiles manu-
factured outside the state); Walling v Michigan, 116 US 446 (1886) (holding that a tax imposed
by a state upon liquor salespeople that necessarily discriminated against the introduction of
products of another state was unconstitutional); Webber v Virginia, 103 US 344, 350-51 (1880)
(invalidating a state statute requiring agents dealing in articles manufactured in other states to
obtain a license); Tiernan v Rinker, 102 US 123 (1880) (holding that a person cannot be subjected
to a higher state tax for the-right to sell imported rather than domestic liquor); Morrill v Wiscon-
sin, 154 US 626 (1877) (following Welton); Welton v Missouri, 91 US 275, 279 (1876) (striking
down a state statute that required licenses of those who sold items "which are not the growth,
produce, or manufacture" of the state); Ward v Maryland, 79 US (12 Wall) 418,431-32 (1870)
(striking down a discriminatory state statute requiring all dealers in imported articles to be li-
censed by the state).
76 See, for example, .M. Darnell & Son Co v City of Memphis, 208 US 113, 121 (1908)
(prohibiting differentiation in state taxation between property coming to rest within a state and
property produced within a state); Charles K. Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution: Its
Origin and Development 249 (Putnam 1922) (noting that the Commerce Clause limits states to
only those taxes that treat the products of interstate commerce equally to those of intrastate
commerce).
77 Cook v Pennsylvania, 97 US 566,574 (1878) (emphasis added) (invalidating a discrimi-
natory state tax on sales made by auctioneers of goods imported from other states in their origi-
nal packages).
78 Hinson v Lott, 75 US (8 Wall) 148,152 (1868) (Miller) (upholding a state flat tax on liq-
uor).
79 Guy v Baltimore, 100 US 434,440 (1879) (invalidating a municipal ordinance establish-
ing discriminatory wharfage rates based on the origin of cargo of vessels).
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mercy of local regulations, having for their object to secure exclu-
sive benefits to the citizens and products of particular States./
The Court similarly struck down state inspection laws that dis-
criminated against out-of-state goods1 or imposed inspection fees that
the Justices deemed unreasonable." In striking down a Minnesota
statute requiring all meat sold in the state to be inspected on the hoof
within twenty-four hours before slaughter, Justice Harlan feared that
"the enactment of a similar statute by each one of the States compos-
ing the Union would result in the destruction of commerce among the
several States" in meat.8
Nor did the Court stop at invalidating such patently discrimina-
tory trade barriers. Even nondiscriminatory impediments to interstate
trade withered beneath the Court's exacting scrutiny. Among the
more conspicuous decisions were those in which the Court compro-
mised the states' powers of internal police by denying them the au-
thority to exclude from their borders such controversial products as
liquor,' oleomargarine," and cigarettes. As Justice Matthews wrote in
80 Id at 440-42.
81 See, for example, Voight v Wright, 141 US 62,66-67 (1891) (invalidating flour inspection
law that required examination of only out-of-state flour); Brimmer v Rebman, 138 US 78, 84
(1891) (striking down a meat inspection statute that required meat processed more than one
hundred miles from the place of sale to be reinspected).
82 See, for example Phipps v Cleveland Refining Co, 261 US 449, 452 (1923) (holding an
"excessive" petroleum inspection fee to be an invalid burden on interstate commerce); Standard
Oil Co v Graves, 249 US 389,396-97 (1919) (invalidating a revenue-generating inspection fee on
petroleum); D.E. Foote & Co v Stanley, 232 US 494,507 (1914) (holding that an inspection fee on
out-of-state products is unconstitutional if it exceeds the costs of inspection).
83 Minnesota v Barber, 136 US 313,321 (1890).
84 See, for example, Rosenberger v Pacific Express Co, 241 US 48 (1916) (holding that state
law imposing special licenses on express companies maintaining offices for C.O.D. shipments of
liquor was unconstitutional as applied to interstate shipments); Rossi v Pennsylvania, 238 US 62
(1916) (narrowly construing congressional statute permitting state regulation of liquor at place
of sale not to apply to interstate shipments); Kirmeyer v Kansas, 236 US 568,573 (1915) (invali-
dating prohibition on interstate liquor wagon traffic); Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co v EW
Cook Brewing Co, 223 US 70,82-83 (1912) (holding prohibition on shipment of liquor to parts
of state unconstitutional as applied to interstate shipments); Adams Express Co v Kentucky, 214
US 218,223 (1909) (invalidating state prohibtion on the shipping of liquor);Adams Express Co v
Kentucky, 206 US 129,138 (1907) (invalidating Kentucky statute punishing shipments of liquor
to be paid for on delivery); American Express Co v Iowa, 196 US 133,146 (1905) (holding uncon-
stitutional a state's seizure of liquor shipped in interstate commerce); Vance v W.A. Vandercook
Co, 170 US 438 (1898) (striking down a state law requiring that any liquor imported from other
states first be certified pure by the state chemist); Scott v Donald, 165 US 58,101 (1897) (invali-
dating statute regulating the use, sale, and transportation of liquor); Lyng v Michigan, 135 US
161, 166 (1890) (invalidating state tax on liquor imported through interstate commerce because
"no state has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form"); Leisy v Hardin, 135 US
100,125 (1890) (invalidating prohibition on sale of liquor as applied to liquor imported from an-
other state). See also Heymen v Southern Railway Co, 203 US 270 (1906) (invalidating a state
liquor regulation); Rhodes v Iowa, 170 US 412,426 (1898) (invalidating a state law banning the
transportation of liquor in trucks, over a vigorous dissent).
85 See Collins v New Hampshire, 171 US 30 (1898) (striking down statute forbidding sale of
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invalidating an Iowa statute requiring all carriers to obtain state certi-
fication before transporting liquor into the state:
Can it be supposed that by omitting any express declarations on
the subject, Congress has intended to submit to the several States
the decision of the question in each locality of what shall and
what shall not be articles of traffic in the interstate commerce of
the country? If so, it has left to each State, according to its own
caprice and arbitrary will, to discriminate for or against every ar-
ticle grown, produced, manufactured, or sold in any State and
sought to be introduced as an article of commerce into any other.
If the State of Iowa may prohibit the importation of intoxicating
liquors from all other States, it may also include tobacco, or any
other article, the use or abuse of which it may deem deleteri-
ous.... It may choose to establish a system directed to the pro-
motion and benefit of its own agriculture, manufactures or arts of
any description, and prevent the introduction and sale within its
limits of any or all articles that it may select as coming into com-
petition with those which it seeks to protect.... In view of the
commercial anarchy and confusion that would result from the di-
verse exertions of power by the several States of the Union, it
cannot be supposed that the Constitution or Congress have in-
tended to limit the freedom of commercial intercourse among
the people of the several States."
At the same time the Court similarly struck down state enact-
ments regulating the operations of interstate carriers,8 prescribing the
oleomargarine unless it was colored pink);Schollenberger v Pennsylvania, 171 US 1,24-25 (1898)
(invalidating state statute prohibiting the sale, in the original package, of uncolored oleomarga-
rine). Plumley v Massachusetts, 155 US 461, 467-68 (1894), however, upheld a state prohibition
on importation of oleomargarine colored to look like butter on a consumer fraud rationale. Simi-
larly, Crossman v Lurman, 192 US 189,209 (1904), upheld a state statute prohibiting the sale in
the state of artificially colored coffee, and Silz v Hesterberg, 211 US 31 (1908), upheld a state act
prohibiting importation of foreign game in order to protect its own game supply.
86 Austin v Tennessee, 179 US 343, 359 (1900) (suggesting in dicta that a state could not
prohibit the interstate sale and transportation of cigarettes in original packages). See also con-
curring opinion of Justice White, 179 US at 363 (finding nothing in majority opinion abandoning
the "original package" doctrine), and dissenting opinion of Justice Brewer, 179 US at 364 (argu-
ing that the power to regulate interstate shipment of cigarettes does not extend to states). See
Thomas A. Sims, The Constitutionality of the Indiana Anti-Cigarette Law, 4 Mich L Rev 124,134,
137 (1905) (discussing the limits of the "original package" rule); Gavit, The Commerce Clause at
128 (cited in note 72) ("The rule can be stated to be that provided goods which have been trans-
ported in interstate commerce are not diseased or misrepresented they may be sold in the origi-
nal package as against a state total prohibition of the sale."); Burdick, The Law of the American
Constitution at 246 (cited in note 76) ("[A] State may not prohibit the shipment into or out of its
borders of goods which are the legitimate subject of commerce.").
87 Bowman v Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co, 125 US 465,493-94 (1888).
88 The Court repeatedly struck down state licensing statutes applying to interstate carriers.
See, for example, Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the Town of Vidalia v McNeely, 274 US 676
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prices of goods sold in interstate commerce, and taxing goods moving
in interstate commerce." If the power to tax such commerce were con-
(1927) (holding that a state may not require a license as a condition precedent to operating an
interstate ferry route); Barrett v City of New York, 232 US 14,33 (1914) (striking down a state li-
censing requirement for interstate carriers as directly burdening interstate commerce); St. Clair
County v Interstate Sand and Car Transfer Co, 192 US 454,467-69 (1904) (invalidating a usage
tax imposed on vessels crossing a state boundary); Harmon v City of Chicago, 147 US 396 (1893)
(striking down a municipal license tax imposed for the privilege of navigating the Chicago
River); Crutcher v Kentucky, 141 US 47,61 (1891) (invalidating a state licensing requirement for
agents of foreign railway companies); Norfolk and Western Railroad Co v Pennsylvania, 136 US
114 (1890) (striking down a state tax levied on a railroad for the privilege of maintaining an of-
fice within the state); McCall v California, 136 US 104 (1890) (holding a California license tax
levied upon an agent of a railway soliciting business for a route between Chicago and New York
unconstitutional); Pickard v Pullman Southern Car Co, 117 US 34 (1886) (invalidating license tax
on sleeping cars). See also Gavit, The Commerce Clause at 350 & n 27 (cited in note 72), and
cases therein cited.
State efforts to fix rates for interstate carriage were similarly struck down. See, for example,
Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Co v Settle, 260 US 166 (1922) (invalidating regulation
of prices for interstate transport); Railroad Commission of Ohio v Worthington, 225 US 101
(1912) (striking down a rate-fixing regulation as applied to goods destined for export to other
states); Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co v Eubank, 184 US 27,41-42 (1902) (invalidating a
state requirement mandating cheaper rates for shorter routes insofar as it sought to regulate in-
terstate commerce); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co v Kentucky, 154 US 204 (1894) (invalidat-
ing state efforts to fix a toll for the use of a boundary crossing bridge); Wabash, St. Louis & Pa-
cific Railway Co v Illinois, 118 US 557,576 (1886) (invalidating a state rate requirement as ap-
plied to goods transported outside of the state). Nor would the Court permit states to prescribe
the locations at which interstate trains made stops. See, for example, Illinois Central Railroad Co
v Illinois, 163 US 142 (1896). States could not order removal of a bridge used in interstate trans-
portation, Kansas City Southern Railway Co v Kaw Valley Drainage District, 233 US 75 (1914);
nor could they regulate the speed of interstate trains, Seaboard Air Line Railway Co v Blackwell,
244 US 310 (1917); nor could they regulate the schedules of interstate trains, Missouri, Kansas &
Texas Railway Co v Texas, 245 US 484 (1918); nor could they require interstate carriers to obtain
certificates of necessity before using state highways, Buck v Kuykendall, 267 US 307,315 (1925);
George W. Bush & Sons Co v Maloy, 267 US 317 (1925); nor could they impose the "direct" bur-
den of requiring an interstate railroad to deliver cars to a private siding, McNeill v Southern
Railway Co,202 US 543,561 (1906); nor could they require interstate carriers to furnish a certain
number of cars for interstate transport on a specified day, Houston & Texas Central Railroad Co
v Mayes, 201 US 321,330-31 (1906). Similarly, the Court disapproved state attempts to regulate
the transmission and receipt of interstate messages by telegraph companies. See Western Union
Telegraph Co v Foster, 247 US 105 (1918) (invalidating law requiring firm to accept all wire stock
quotes); Western Union Telegraph Co v Pendleton, 122 US 347 (1887) (striking down law requir-
ing telegraph operators to hand deliver messages).
89 See, for example, Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v Attleboro Steam & Elec-
tric Co, 273 US 83,89 (1927) (invalidating a state's regulation of rates charged for electric current
delivered to neighboring states); Missouri v Kansas Natural Gas Co, 265 US 298,308-09 (1924)
(striking down a state attempt to fix the rates of natural gas piped out of the state); Lemke v
Farmers Grain Co, 258 US 50 (1922) (invalidating a state law imposing a licensing fee on grain
buyers, substantial regulation of grain elevators, and price controls on grain produced for export
to other states as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce).
90 See, for example, Eureka Pipe Line Co v Hallanan, 257 US 265,271 (1921) (invalidating
a state tax on oil temporarily stored prior to its transport out of the state); Kelley v Rhoads, 188
US 1, 8-9 (1903) (exempting from application of a state tax certain sheep being driven through
the taxing state); Western Union Telegraph Co v Pennsylvania, 128 US 39,39-40 (1889) (holding
unconstitutional state laws levying a tax on the transmittal of messages beyond the borders of
the state); Fargo v Michigan, 121 US 230,243-47 (1887) (invalidating gross receipts tax on rail-
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ceded, opined Justice Strong, then the tax might be made "so onerous
that an interchange of commodities with other States would be ren-
dered impossible."'" Maintaining that all negotiations for sales of tan-
gible goods to be shipped across state lines were themselves interstate
commerce, the Court repeatedly invalidated state and local efforts to
license or tax those soliciting or transacting such interstate business.?
road carrying freight and passengers into, out of, or through the state); Reading Railroad Co v
Pennsylvania ("State Freight Tax Case"), 82 US (15 Wall) 232,281-82 (1873) (striking down a per
pound state tax on freight). See also State Freight Tax Case, 82 US (15 Wall) at 299 (Miller dis-
senting in part) (Full recognition of the principle that states cannot tax interstate commerce "is
essential to the harmonious future of this country ... The interstate commerce to-day far exceeds
in value that which is foreign, and it is of immense importance that it should not be shackled by
restrictions imposed by any State in order to place on others the burden of supporting its own
government, as was done in the days of the helpless Confederation.").
91 State Freight Tax Case, 82 US (15 Wall) at 276."[h]f one State can directly tax persons or
property passing through it, or tax them indirectly by levying a tax upon their transportation,
every other may, and thus commercial intercourse between States remote from each other may
be destroyed. The produce of the Western States may thus be effectually excluded from Eastern
markets, for though it might bear the imposition of a single tax, it would be crushed under the
load of many. It was to guard against the possibility of such commercial embarrassments, no
doubt, that the power of regulating commerce among the States was conferred upon the Federal
Government." Id at 280.
92 See, for example, Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co v Tax Commission, 297 US 403,412-
13 (1936) ("While a State may tax the privilege of engaging in local business ... it may not tax
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce."); Real Silk Hosiery Mills v Portland, 268 US
325,335-36 (1925) (striking down a license tax on solicitors of orders to be filled by an out-of-
state manufacturer); Shafer v Farmers Grain Co, 268 US 189,199 (1925) (striking down a license
requirement for the purchase of grain within a state where the grain sold was to be immediately
shipped out of the state); Texas Co v Brown,258 US 466,475-77 (1922) (striking down a Georgia
inspection fee for oil and gasoline as applied to products still in interstate commerce); Dahnke-
Walker Milling Co v Bondurant, 257 US 282,290-92 (1921) (invalidating state conditions on the
conduct of foreign corporations as applied to purchase of domestic wheat to be shipped outside
the state); Bowman v Continental Oil Co, 256 US 642, 646-47 (1921) (invalidating a state privi-
lege tax as applied to the interstate component of the business, which was gasoline imported
from out of state); Askren v Continental Oil Co, 252 US 444, 447 (1920) (striking down a state
privilege tax as applied to distributors bringing gasoline in from outside the state for sale within
the state); York Manufacturing Co v Colley, 247 US 21,23-26 (1918) (holding that employment
of a non-resident engineer by a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the construction of an ice-
making plant in Texas did not involve the doing of local business subject to state regulation);
Crew Levick Co v Pennsylvania, 245 US 292,296-97 (1917) (invalidating a state privilege tax as
applied to the interstate component of the corporation's business); Western Oil Refining Co v
Lipscomb, 244 US 346,349-50 (1917) (invalidating a privilege tax where imposed on a foreign
corporation delivering oil to customers within the taxing state); Cheney Brothers Co v Massachu-
seas, 246 US 147, 155-56 (1916) (invalidating an excise tax on foreign corporations engaged in
solicitation of orders subject to the home office's approval); Stewart v Michigan, 232 US 665, 670
(1914) (striking down a state statute requiring a license for catalogue sales); Crenshaw vArkan-
sas, 227 US 389, 399-401 (1913) (striking down a state law requiring a foreign corporation ac-
tively soliciting sales within the taxing state to obtain a license); Dozier v Alabama, 218 US 124,
127-28 (1910) (striking down a licensing requirement imposed on the solicitors of photography
enlargement services and frames manufactured in another state); International Textbook Co v
Pigg, 217 US 91, 107 (1910) (holding unconstitutional a state statute requiring an educational
publishing company to pay a license fee for sending and receiving correspondence); Rearick v
Pennsylvania, 203 US 507, 510-11 (1906) (striking down a municipal licensing requirement for
the solicitation of orders for goods manufactured in another state); Norfolk and Western Railway
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In striking down a local tax on drummers, the Court noted that "[t]his
kind of taxation is usually imposed at the instance and solicitation of
domestic dealers, as a means of protecting them from foreign competi-
tion."93 If a state were thus permitted to "impose restrictions upon in-
terstate commerce for the benefit and protection of its own citizens,"
wrote Justice Bradley in an opinion suffused with consequentialist
analysis, "we are brought back to the condition of things which existed
before the adoption of the Constitution, and which was one of the
principal causes that led to it."'' If regulation of drummers were desir-
able, Congress alone could provide it. For it was
obvious that such regulations should be based on a uniform sys-
tem applicable to the whole country, and not left to the varied,
discordant, or retaliatory enactments of forty different states. The
confusion into which the commerce of the country would be
thrown by being subject to state legislation on this subject, would
be but a repetition of the disorder which prevailed under the Ar-
ticles of Confederation.9
The Court's use of the dormant Commerce Clause to vitiate such pa-
rochial legislation played a critical, instrumental role in opening a na-
tional market.6 As Charles Warren remarked of one leading decision,
its effect "upon the development of the great transcontinental trade,
Co v Sims, 191 US 441,449-51 (1903) (invalidating a state licensing requirement imposed on an
express company acting as an agent of the dealer for the importation of a sewing machine); At-
lantic and Pacific Telegraph Co v Philadelphia, 190 US 160,162 (1903) ("No State can compel a
party, individual or corporation to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.");
Caldwell v North Carolina, 187 US 622 (1903) (striking down a municipal ordinance taxing per-
sons engaged in the business of selling photographs as applied to a representative of a firm resid-
ing outside of the state); Stockard v Morgan, 185 US 27,36-37 (1902) (following Brennan); Bren-
nan v Titusville, 153 US 289,306-08 (1894) (striking down a licensing tax on persons engaged in
trade on behalf of firms doing business outside the state); Asher v Texas, 128 US 129 (1888) (in-
validating a state privilege tax as applied to agents representing out-of-state firms); Corson v
Maryland, 120 US 502,505-06 (1887) (invalidating a state licensing requirement as applied to an
agent of a New York firm soliciting sales in Maryland).
93 Robbins v Shelby County Taxing District, 120 US 489, 498 (1887) (invalidating a state
privilege tax as applied to dealers of paper products representing foreign-state firms).
94 Id.
95 Id at 498-99.
96 See James W. Ely, Jr., The ChiefJusticeship of Melville W. Fuller, 1888-1910 141 (South
Carolina 1995) (arguing that the objective of the Court was to establish a national market for
goods); Owen M. Fiss, 8 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Troubled Beginnings
of the Modem State, 1888-1910 66, 259, 266, 270, 274, 278-79, 291 (Macmillan 1993); McCurdy,
The Knight Sugar Decision at 309-14 (cited in note 5); Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and
the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875-1890,38 J Econ Hist 631 (1978) (arguing
that the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence enabled the growth of American in-
dustry); Bickel, Unpublished Opinions at 100 (cited in note 51); James Willard Hurst, Law and
the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States 44-51 (Wisconsin 1956) (dis-
cussing the effect of court action in the absence of preemptive federal legislation).
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and the unrestricted movement of wheat, ore and coal in this country
cannot be overestimated."'
Commentators observed that this refashioning of dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence proceeded upon the theory that Con-
gress's power to regulate interstate commerce was exclusive.s But use-
97 Charles Warren, 2 The Supreme Court in United States History 627 (Little, Brown 1937).
Warren referred to the State Freight Tax Case, 82 US (15 Wall) at 232.
98 See Kallenbach, Federal Cooperation at 8-9, 18, 27, 31,40-41,44-45 (cited in note 73)
(explaining the negative implications of the Commerce Clause); Edward Corwin, Commerce
Power at 152 (cited in note 5) ("[T]he Court had firmly established the doctrine that Congress's
power under the commerce clause is as to most important matters an exclusive power. The con-
sequence of this doctrine is that any State law which, in the judgment of the Court, affects inter-
state commerce to such an extent as to 'regulate' it, is ipso facto void. This doctrine has been
highly beneficial in permitting business interests to spread over the country without much regard
to State lines."); John B. Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U Chi L
Rev 556,583 (1936) (analyzing the Commerce Clause amidst congressional silence); Gavit, The
Commerce Clause at 4-9,15-20,27,127,160 (cited in note 72); Cooke, The Commerce Clause at
iv, 110-20, 137 (cited in note 72) (describing Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the absence of
congressional action); James S. Rogers, The Exclusiveness of the Power of Congress Over Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 44 Am L Reg (new series) 539,593 (1905); David Walter Brown,
The Exclusive Power of Congress to Regulate Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 4 Colum L Rev
490, 491, 497-99 (1904) (claiming that the Commerce Clause prevented states from asserting
wholly local interests to justify regulating interstate commerce); A.H. Wintersteen, The Com-
merce Clause and the State, 28 Am L Reg (new series) 733, 737-42 (1889); Louis M. Greeley,
What is the Test of a Regulation of Foreign or Interstate Commerce?, 1 Harv L Rev 159,174-75,
183 (1887). Kallenbach maintained that "under the influence of nationally minded judges" the
exclusive power theory's "acceptance and application became a matter of such common occur-
rence as to make it a truism of American constitutional law." Kallenbach, Federal Cooperation at
40.
For judicial expressions of the exclusive power view, see, for example, Helson and Randolph
v Kentucky, 279 US 245,248 (1929) ("Regulation of interstate and foreign commerce is a matter
committed exclusively to the control of Congress"); Pennsylvania v West Virginia, 262 US 553,
596 (1923) ("[T]he power to regulate interstate commerce is expressly committed to Congress
and therefore impliedly forbidden to the States"); Heisler v Thomas Colliery Co, 260 US 245,259
(1922) ("The action of the State as a regulation of interstate commerce does not depend upon
the degree of interference; it is illegal in any degree."); Texas Co, 258 US at 475 (Excessive in-
spection fees constitute "a burden upon the commerce amounting to a regulation of it, and hence
[are] invalid because inconsistent with the exclusive authority of Congress over that subject.");
Bethlehem Motors Corp v Flynt, 256 US 421, 427 (1921) (Imposition of tax is "practically the
usurpation of the power of Congress over interstate commerce, and therefore illegal."); Pure Oil
Co v Minnesota, 248 US 158,162 (1918) (An excessive inspection fee "will be declared void be-
cause constituting, in its operation, an obstruction to and burden upon that commerce among the
States the exclusive regulation of which is committed to Congress by the Constitution."); Interna-
tional Paper Co v Massachusetts, 246 US 135,141 (1918) ("Under the commerce clause exclusive
power to regulate interstate commerce rests in Congress, and a state statute which either directly
or by its necessary operation burdens such commerce is invalid, regardless of the purpose with
which it was enacted."); Sligh v Kirkwood, 237 US 52,58 (1915) ("That Congress has the exclu-
sive power to regulate interstate commerce is beyond question."); Railroad Commission of Ohio
v Worthington, 225 US 101, 107 (1912) ("It is not necessary to review the cases in this court which
have settled beyond peradventure that the National Government has exclusive authority to
regulate interstate commerce under the Constitution of the United States"); Southern Railway
Co v King, 217 US 524,531 (1910) ("[T]he right to regulate interstate commerce is, by virtue of
the Federal Constitution, exclusively vested in the Congress of the United States."); Adams Ex-
press Co, 206 US at 135 (Transaction was "one of interstate commerce, and within the exclusive
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ful as the exclusive power theory may have been for purposes of raz-
ing state trade barriers, it, like the government's argument in
Schechter, proved too much." As Bernard Gavit put it, "The immedi-
ately exclusive theory took in too much territory."'' If that theory
were followed to its logical conclusion the result [would have
been] nothing short of disastrous.... If the exclusiveness of Fed-
eral control were given its apparently logical application all but a
small part of the conduct and interests of persons engaged in in-
terstate and foreign commerce [would have been] outside of any
law. It would have been incumbent upon Congress to have legis-
lated immediately and in detail on the subject,-an impossible
task.'1
jurisdiction of Congress"); Asbell v Kansas, 209 US 251,254 (1908) ("The governmental power
over the commerce which is interstate is vested exclusively in the Congress by the commerce
clause of the Constitution, and therefore is withdrawn from the States"); Iroquois Transportation
Co v DeLaney Forge Co ("The Winnebago"), 205 US 354,363 (1907) ("[T]he Constitution gives
exclusive jurisdiction [over interstate commerce] to Congress."); E. U. McLean & Co v Denver &
Rio Grande Railroad Co, 203 US 38,49-50 (1906) ("It has been too frequently decided by this
court to require the restatement of the decisions, that the exclusive power to regulate interstate
commerce is vested by the Constitution in Congress"); Harmon v Chicago, 147 US 396, 407
(1893) (Ordinance is "plainly and palpably in conflict with the exclusive power of Congress to
regulate commerce, interstate and foreign."); Crutcher v Kentucky, 141 US 47,59-60 (1891) ("[1]t
does not follow that everything which the legislature may deem essential for the good order of
society and the well being of its citizens can be set up against the exclusive power of Congress to
regulate the operations of foreign and interstate commerce'); Lyng v Michigan, 135 US 161,166
(1890) ("[N]o state has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, whether by way
of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or on the receipts derived
from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, for the reason that
such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it, which belongs
solely to Congress"); Walling v Michigan, 116 US 446,455 (1886) ("We have so often held that
the power given to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several
States and with the Indian Tribes, is exclusive in all matters which require, or only admit of; gen-
eral and uniform rules."); Brown v Houston, 114 US 622,630-31 (1885) (The power of Congress
over commerce among the States "is certainly so far exclusive that no State has power to make
any law or regulation which will affect the free and unrestrained intercourse and trade between
the States... All laws and regulations are restrictive of natural freedom to some extent, and
where no regulation is imposed by the government which has the exclusive power to regulate, it
is an indication of its will that the matter shall be left free.'); County of Mobile v Kimball, 102 US
691, 697 (1880) ("[C]ommerce with foreign countries or between the States which consists in the
transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities ... can of necessity be only one sys-
tem or plan of regulations, and that Congress alone can prescribe.").
99 See Greeley, 1 Harv L Rev at 181 (cited in note 98).
100 Gavit, The Commerce Clause at 16 (cited in note 72).
101 Id at 8-9. Alexander Bickel agreed that "the doctrine could not be maintained" so
"sweepingly and rigidly." He noted:
It was never intended, by encouraging the free flow of commerce, to impair the existence of
the states as viable units of government. Yet that would have been the result of the success-
ful operation of the Commerce Clause, if in promoting the rise of a national economy it had
been permitted to withdraw more and more and finally nearly all wealth-producing activity
from the regulatory and taxing jurisdiction of the several states. The problem has been to
balance the needs of a state as against those of the nation, and not to force the sacrifice of
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Such a conclusion, wrote Frederick Cooke, would have been "intoler-
able.'"' It would have opened a regulatory vacuum beyond Edward
Corwin's worst nightmares. '
The doctrinal categories through which the Justices avoided these
undesirable consequences of the exclusive power theory are familiar
to students of the Court's affirmative Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. The Court consistently maintained that regulations touching a
"nationa1" matter or burdening interstate commerce "directly" were
what is vital to the one for the sake of what is trivial to the other.
Bickel, Unpublished Opinions at 100 (cited in note 51).
102 Cooke, The Commerce Clause at 120 (cited in note 72). David Walter Brown remarked
that if "the States were deprived of the right to legislate upon all subjects connected with [inter-
state] commerce, local self government and the autonomy of the States would become illusory."
Brown, 4 Colum L Rev at 491 (cited in note 98). George G. Reynolds concurred: "To declare that
all state legislation affecting interstate commerce was prohibited by the commerce clause was
manifestly impossible; the indirect effects of legislation required by local needs are so wide-
spread and so easily reach interstate commerce, that such an interpretation would have de-
stroyed the governments of all the states." George G. Reynolds, The Distribution of Power to
Regulate Interstate Carriers Between the Nation and the States 77 (Columbia 1928).
103 See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, in R.G. McCloskey, ed, Essays in
Constitutional Law 185,208 (Knopf 1957) (criticizing Hammer v Dagenhart, 247 US 251 (1918),
for creating a "realm of no-power, a 'twilight zone,' a 'no-man's land' in which corporate enter-
prise was free to roam largely unchecked").
104 See, for example, Caldwell, 187 US at 625 ("The Constitution of the United States, hav-
ing given to Congress the power to regulate commerce ... among the several States, that power
is necessarily exclusive whenever the subjects of it are national in their character, or admit only
of one uniform system or plan of regulation'); Western Union Telegraph Co v James, 162 US 650,
655 (1896) ("The matters upon which the silence of Congress is equivalent to affirmative legisla-
tion are national in their character."); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co, 154 US at 212
("[W]herever such laws, instead of being of a local nature and not affecting interstate commerce
but incidentally, are national in their character, the non-action of Congress indicates its will that
such commerce shall be free and untrammelled, and the case falls within the [category] of those
laws wherein the jurisdiction of Congress is exclusive.'); In re Rahrer, 140 US 545,555 (1891)
("The power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states, when the subjects of
that power are national in nature, is also exclusive.'); Bowman, 125 US at 507-08 ("[W]here the
subject is national in its character, and admits and requires uniformity of regulation, affecting
alike all the States, such as transportation between the States, including the importation of goods
from one State into another, Congress can alone act upon it and provide the needed regula-
tions."); Robbins, 120 US at 492 ("[T]he Constitution of the United States having given to Con-
gress the power to regulate commerce ... among the several states, that power is necessarily ex-
clusive whenever the subjects of it are national in their character."); Brown, 114 US at 630
("[T]he power of Congress is exclusive wherever the matter is national in its character or admits
of one uniform system or plan of regulation."); Gloucester Ferry Co v Pennsylvania, 114 US 196,
204 (1885) ("[When [the subjects] are national in their character, and require uniformity of
regulation affecting alike all the states, the power of Congress is exclusive."); Tiernan, 102 US at
126 ("[W]hen the subject to which the power applies is national in its character, or of such a na-
ture as to admit of uniformity of regulation, the power is exclusive of State authority."); Welton,
91 US at 280 ("[W]here the subject to which the power applies is national in its character, or of
such a nature as to admit of uniformity of regulation, the power is exclusive of all State author-
ity."); State Freight Tax Case, 82 US (15 Wall) at 279-80 ("[W]henever the subjects over which a
power to regulate commerce is asserted are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform sys-
tem or plan of regulation, they may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive
legislation by Congress."); Hinson,75 US at 152 ("[T]here is a class of legislation of a general na-
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unconstitutional."' But where "local" matters were concerned, any
valid exercise of the police power ' or the power to tax that affected
ture, affecting the commercial interests of all the States, which, from its essential character, is Na-
tional, and which must, so far as it affects these interests belong exclusively to the Federal gov-
ernment.").
105 See, for example, Helson and Randolf, 279 US at 249 ("[A] state law which directly bur-
dens [interstate] commerce by taxation or otherwise, constitutes a regulation beyond the power
of the state under the Constitution."); Kansas Natural Gas Co, 265 US at 307 ("In the absence of
congressional legislation, a State may constitutionally impose taxes, enact inspection laws, quar-
antine laws and, generally, laws of internal police, although they may have an incidental effect on
interstate commerce. But the commerce clause of the Constitution, of its own force, restrains the
States from imposing direct burdens upon interstate commerce."); Standard Oil Co, 249 US at
396-97 (Excessive inspection fee "imposes a direct burden upon" interstate commerce.); Looney
v Crane Co, 245 US 178,187 (1917) (striking down state taxes imposing "direct burdens on inter-
state commerce"); SeaboardAir Line Railway Co, 244 US at 315 ("[T]he power of the State can-
not be exercised to directly burden interstate commerce."); Kansas City Railway v Botkin, 240
US 227, 231 (1916) (State may not impose a tax which "has such a direct relation to interstate
commerce as to be an exercise of a power prohibited by the commerce clause.'); Rossi, 238 US at
66 (State legislation which "directly interferes with" interstate transportation of liquor violates
commerce clause.); Kansas City Southern Railway Co, 233 US at 79 ("[A] direct interference
with commerce among the States could not be justified" "by simply invoking the convenient
apologetics of the police power."); Crenshaw, 227 US at 395 (State licensing law "imposes a di-
rect burden upon interstate commerce, exclusively within Federal control, and therefore beyond
the power of the State to regulate."); Worthington, 225 US at 111 (invalidating state statute that
"attempted to directly regulate and control interstate commerce"); Southern Railway Co v King,
217 US 524, 531 (1910) ("The States cannot pass any law directly regulating [interstate] com-
merce:'); West v Kansas Natural Gas Co, 221 US 229,262 (1911) ("[N]o State can by action or
inaction prevent, unreasonably burden, discriminate against, or directly regulate interstate com-
merce or the right to carry it on."); Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co, 118 US at 589 (Brad-
ley dissenting) ("[D]irect regulations and burdens upon [interstate commerce] come fairly within
the exclusive prerogatives of Congress."); Interstate Sand and Car Transfer Co, 192 US at 469-70
(striking down state licensing requirement imposing "a direct burden upon interstate com-
merce"); Brennan, 153 US at 304 ("[W]hatever may be the extent to which the police power of
the State can go, it cannot go so far as to uphold any regulations directly affecting interstate
commerce."); Bowman, 125 US at 498 (invalidating "a regulation directly affecting interstate
commerce in an essential and vital point").
106 See, for example, Sligh, 237 US at 58,61 (upholding state statute making it a crime to de-
liver citrus fruits unfit for consumption, noting that "the competency of the State to provide local
measures in the interest of the safety and welfare of the people is not doubted, although such
regulations incidentally and indirectly involve interstate commerce .... [T]he mere fact that in-
terstate commerce is indirectly affected will not prevent the State from exercising its police
power"); Hendrick v Maryland, 235 US 610,622 (1915) (upholding state automobile registration
requirement as "but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the
States and essential to the preservation of the health, safety and comfort of their citizens," which
did "not constitute a direct and material burden on interstate commerce"); King, 217 US at 532
("[T]he rights of the States to pass laws not having the effect to regulate or directly interfere
with the operations of interstate commerce, passed in the exercise of the police power of the
State in the interest of the public health and safety, have been maintained by the decisions of this
court."). See also HJ. Davenport, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce 1, 26 Pol Sci Q 643
(1911) (describing the state power to tax within Commerce Clause limits); Charles C. Bonney,
The Relation of the Police Power of the States to the Commerce Power of the Nation, 25 Am L
Rev 159 (1891) (delineating the scope of the police power).
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interstate commerce only "incidentally ' '  or "indirectly" ''   did not
constitute impermissible encroachment upon the national domain."'
As Justice Hughes put it in the Minnesota Rate Cases,"' which formed
the basis for his opinion in Shreveport"' the following year, "If a state
enactment imposes a direct burden upon interstate commerce, it must
fall regardless of Federal legislation; 11 2 but "it is competent for a State
107 Kallenbach, Federal Cooperation at 8 (cited in note 73) (asserting that states have a
power to regulate commerce in its strictly local aspects); Gavit, The Commerce Clause at 7 (cited
in note 72); Cooke, The Commerce Clause at 119-20 (cited in note 72) (claiming that the states
cannot be deprived of all power to regulate when commerce is at all affected); Paul Fuller, Is
There a Federal Police Power?, 4 Colum L Rev 563,587 (1904) (arguing that incidental interfer-
ence with state commerce is permitted); Lewis, The Federal Commerce Power at 38-39 (cited in
note 72); Charles A. Culberson, The Supreme Court and Interstate Commerce, 24 Am L Rev 25,
38 (1890) ("It is not thought that the power does or was ever intended to take from the States
their inherent and reserved right to legislate upon all subjects of an internal or domestic nature,
even though in so doing foreign and interstate commerce may be indirectly or incidentally in-
volved.").
108 See, for example, Atlantic Lumber Co v Commissioner, 298 US 553,557 (1936) (uphold-
ing tax where "the effect upon interstate commerce, so far as there is any, is remote and inciden-
tal"); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co v McLaughlin, 298 US 155,158 (1936) (upholding mer-
chant licensing law having only an "indirect and incidental" effect upon interstate commerce);
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co, 297 US at 419 (upholding tax "laid upon intrastate commerce
only and [] not shown to be a direct burden upon interstate commerce"); Hump Hairpin Manu-
facturing Co v Emmerson, 258 US 290,294 (1922) (upholding "a state excise tax which affects
[interstate] commerce, not directly, but only incidentally and remotely"); Denver & Rio Grande
Railroad Co v City of Denver, 250 US 241,246 (1919) (upholding ordinance affecting interstate
commerce "only incidentally and indirectly"); United States Glue Co v Town of Oak Creek, 247
US 321, 326 (1918) ("It is settled that a State may not directly burden interstate commerce, ei-
ther by taxation or otherwise. But a tax that only indirectly affects the profits or returns from
such commerce is not within the rule."); Silz v Hesterberg,211 US 31,40-41 (1908) ("That a state
may not pass laws directly regulating foreign or interstate commerce has frequently been held in
the decisions of this court. But ... laws passed by the States in the exertion of their police power,
not in conflict with laws of Congress upon the same subject, and indirectly or remotely affecting
interstate commerce, are nevertheless valid laws.");Allen v Pullman's Palace Car Co, 191 US 171,
180-81 (1903) (While the Court's dormant commerce clause cases "show a zealous care to pre-
serve the exclusive right of Congress to regulate interstate traffic, the corresponding right of the
State to tax and control the internal business of the State, although thereby foreign or interstate
commerce may be indirectly affected, has been recognized with equal clearness."); Ficklen v
Shelby County Taxing District, 145 US 1, 24 (1892) (upholding local occupation tax that affected
interstate commerce only "incidentally, and so remotely as not to amount to a regulation of such
commerce"); Sherlock v Ailing, 93 US 99, 103 (1876) ("In conferring upon Congress the regula-
tion of commerce, it was never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects relat-
ing to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the
commerce of the country. Legislation, in a great variety of ways, may affect commerce and per-
sons engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion.').
109 This is noted in Stone, et al, Constitutional Law at 290-92 (cited in note 1).The creation
of the distinction between direct and indirect effects on commerce has been credited to Justice
Field's opinion in Sherlock, 93 US at 103. See John B. Sholley, The Negative Implications of the
Commerce Clause, 3 U Chi L Rev at 582 (cited in note 98).
110 Simpson v Shepard ("Minnesota Rate Cases"), 230 US 352 (1913).
111 234 US at 350-51.
112 The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 US at 396 (emphasis added). See also id at 399-400 (de-
tailing the reasoning behind the negative implications of the Commerce Clause).
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to govern its internal commerce, to provide local improvements, to
create and regulate local facilities, to adopt protective measures of a
reasonable character in the interest of the health, safety, morals and
welfare of its people, although interstate commerce may incidentally
or indirectly be involved..... Hughes explained this in terms he would
echo in his Schechter opinion two decades later:
In the intimacy of commercial relations, much that is done in the
superintendence of local matters may have an indirect bearing
upon interstate commerce. The development of local resources
and the extension of local facilities may have a very important ef-
fect upon communities less favored and to an appreciable degree
alter the course of trade. The freedom of local trade may stimu-
late interstate commerce, while restrictive measures within the
police power of the State enacted exclusively with respect to in-
ternal business, as distinguished from interstate traffic, may in
their reflex or indirect influence diminish the latter and reduce
the volume of articles transported into or out of the State."'
As Hughes observed, however, the Court had consistently rejected the
contention that such indirect effects upon commerce rendered such
state regulations constitutionally infirm."s Justice Holmes put it this
way in Diamond Glue Co v United States Glue Co: 16
In modern societies every part is related so organically to every
other, that what affects any portion must be felt more or less by
all the rest. Therefore, unless everything is to be forbidden and
legislation is to come to a stop, it is not enough to show that, in
the working of a statute, there is some tendency, logically dis-
cernible, to interfere with commerce .... Practical lines have to be
drawn.
117
The "practical lines" to be drawn in order to prevent the dormant
Commerce Clause from prohibiting all state regulation were the dis-
113 Id at 402. Following the Minnesota Rate Cases in upholding local rate regulation affect-
ing commerce only "incidentally" were Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co v Garrett, 231 US 298
(1913); Allen v St Loui; Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co, 230 US 553 (1913); Southern
Pacific Co v Campbell, 230 US 537 (1913); Oregon Railroad & Navigation Co v Campbell, 230
US 525 (1913); Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co v Conley, 230 US 513 (1913); Missouri Rate
Cases, 230 US 474.
114 Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 US at 410-11.
115 Id.
116 187 US 611 (1903).
117 Id at 616. For another instance of Holmes's concern with the preservation of state regu-
latory and taxing prerogatives through the drawing of "practical lines" in dormant Commerce
Clause cases, see Superior Oil Co v Mississippi, 280 US 390,395 (1929) (upholding imposition of
tax on distributors of gasoline, noting that it "is important to prevent [the commerce] clause be-
ing used to deprive the States of their lifeblood by a strained interpretation of facts").
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tinctions between the "local" and the "national," and between "direct"
and "indirect" effects.18
The Justices employed this vocabulary rather indiscriminately
across a broad range of cases, causing no end of confusion and con-
sternation among contemporary commentators. 19 For present pur-
poses, it is important only that we distinguish between two types. The
first class of cases, descending from Cooley v Board of Wardens of the
Port of Philadelphia,'" recognized subjects over which Congress's ju-
risdiction was paramount but not exclusive. With respect to such mat-
ters, it was held, "[T]he States may legislate in the absence of congres-
sional regulations."' 2' In such instances, wrote Justice Curtis, "[T]he na-
ture of the subject" was "such, that until Congress should find it neces-
sary to exert its power, it should be left to the legislation of the
States.' Such matters were "local and not national," and were "likely
to be the best provided for, not by one system, or plan of regulations,
but by as many as the legislative discretion of the several States
should deem applicable" to local conditions. '2 As Justice Field later
put it, "[W]here the subjects on which the power may be exercised are
local in their nature or operation, or constitute mere aids to com-
merce, the authority of the State may be exerted for their regulation
and management until Congress interferes and supersedes it."'  As
F.D.G. Ribble summarized the rule in 1937, "It thus appears that a
state statute, dealing with subjects of interstate commerce which de-
mand national regulation, is per se a burden on interstate commerce
118 On Justice Brandeis's persistent fidelity to the "strangely formal" distinction between di-
rect and indirect effects in dormant Commerce Clause cases, see Bickel, Unpublished Opinions
at 115-18, 128, 132-33, 155, 195-96 (cited in note 51). See, for example, Cudahy Packing Co v
Hinkle, 278 US 460, 470 (1929) (Brandeis dissenting) (claiming that a corporate tax only indi-
rectly affected commerce); Ozark Pipe Line Corp v Monier, 266 US 555, 569-70 (1925)
(Brandeis dissenting) (arguing that a tax on a corporation engaged in interstate commerce only
indirectly affected such commerce); Texas Transport & Terminal Co v City of New Orleans, 264
US 150, 155 (1924) (Brandeis dissenting) (asserting that a tax on a shipping business only indi-
rectly affected interstate commerce).
119 See, for example, Ribble, State and National Power at 202-06,216-23,230,234-35 (cited
in note 72) (claiming that the precise meaning of these terms was often unclear); Gavit, The
Commerce Clause at ch I (cited in note 72).
120 53 US (12 How) 299 (1851).
121 Id at 319.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Escanaba Co v Chicago, 107 US 678,687 (1882) (holding that states have plenary con-
trol over navigable rivers until Congress acts). See also Walter C Noyes, Development of the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 16 Yale L J 253,257-58 (1907) ("It is only in the case of lo-
cal matters-in matters which are rather auxiliary to commerce than a part of it-that the states
have power to act in the absence of action by Congress."); Prentice and Egan, The Commerce
Clause at 28 (cited in note 72) ("[I]n matters of local nature, such as are auxiliary to commerce
rather than a part of it, the inaction of Congress is to be taken as an indication that for the time
being, and until it sees fit to act, they may be regulated by State authority.").
[67:10891114
2000] Formalism and Realism
or, otherwise expressed, directly affects that commerce. Similarly, state
statutes dealing with those subjects which admit of local regulation af-
fect interstate commerce indirectly. ' '
Although the Court applied the Cooley rule in a variety of cases,
some examples may provide a sense of its limited scope.' Nondis-
criminatory labeling and inspection statutes imposing only reasonable
fees were sustained, notwithstanding their "indirect and incidental" ef-
fect on interstate commerce." State quarantine statutes also passed
constitutional muster, even though they "may incidentally or indi-
rectly affect" interstate commerce. ' Grain elevators were only "inci-
125 Ribble, State and National Power at 221 (cited in note 72). In 1922, CK. Burdick
observed,
[n a large number of cases, and particularly in those of more recent date, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the States in the exercises of their police power for the protec-
tion of their citizens, may incidentally, and sometimes quite directly, affect interstate com-
merce, and has declared that this is not an unconstitutional invasion of the field of congres-
sional legislation, as long as the state action constitutes a bona fide exercise of the police
power, and does not unduly burden interstate commerce, and is not in conflict with any ex-
isting federal legislation. It would seem that this principle would include all those cases
which have been held to fall within the doctrine framed in the Port Wardens case, and that it
states the basis of state action more satisfactorily. It is not surprising, therefore, that we hear
less and less of the States' concurrent power over interstate commerce, and more of the va-
lidity of state police regulations which incidentally affect such commerce.
Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution at 244-45 (cited in note 76).
126 Justice Stone offered a catalog in South Carolina Highway Department v Barnwell
Brothers; Inc, 303 US 177 (1938). He listed state regulation of "its own highways, canals and rail-
roads," "intrastate carriers," id at 187, "those which sanction obstructions in navigable rivers, ap-
prove the erection of bridges over navigable streams, require payment of fees as an incident to
use of harbors, control the location of docks, impose wharfage charges, establish inspection and
quarantine laws, and regulate the taking or exportation of domestic game." Id at 188 n 5 (cita-
tions omitted). See also, for example, Westel W. Willoughby, Principles of the Constitutional Law
of the United States 1000-01 (New York 2d ed 1929); Judson, The Law of Interstate Commerce at
40-41 (cited in note 72); Frank J. Goodnow, The Power of Congress to Regulate Commerce, 25
Pol Sci Q 220,223 (1910) (State may, "in the absence of action by Congress," regulate such "local
matters" as "pilotage, quarantine, port regulations and wharfage."); Prentice and Egan, The
Commerce Clause at 27 (cited in note 72) ("[Ihe States may establish port regulations, regula-
tions of pilotage, may improve their harbors and rivers, erect bridges and dams.").
127 Savage v Jones, 225 US 501,528 (1912) (inspection charge for stock food). See also Corn
Products Refining Co v Eddy, 249 US 427,432 (1919) (upholding a Kansas requirement that corn
syrup containers include a label displaying ingredients despite its "incidental interference" with
interstate commerce); Pure Oil Co, 248 US 158 (illuminating oils and gasoline); Standard Stock
Food Co v Wright, 225 US 540 (1912) (stock food); Lindsay and Phelps Co v Mullen, 176 US 126
(1900) (lumber); Patapsco Guano Co v North Carolina Board ofAgriculture, 171 US 345 (1898)
(fertilizer).
128 Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Co v Haber, 169 US 613,627 (1898) (upholding cat-
tle quarantine statute). See, for example, Clason v Indiana, 306 US 439, 443 (1939) (upholding
statute requiring license to transport large dead animals not slaughtered for human consumption
on the state highways as an "appropriate sanitary measure whose effect upon interstate com-
merce, if any, is merely incidental"); Mintz v Baldwin, 289 US 346,350 (1933) (upholding cattle
inspection law); Asbell, 209 US at 255-56 (upholding state cattle inspection statute as a valid ex-
ercise of the police power); Reid v Colorado, 187 US 137,148-49 (1902) (upholding cattle quar-
antine statute); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v Louisiana State Board of Health,
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dentally" connected with interstate commerce, and regulation of their
rates was "a thing of domestic concern" operating on interstate com-
merce only "indirectly..... With respect to this class of cases, the per-
missibility of state regulation did not preclude federal action. In each
instance the opinion indicated that regulation of the matter in ques-
tion was within congressional competence.
It was sometimes remarked of the statutes in this first class of
cases that, while they might "affect" interstate commerce, they were
not "regulations" of it "in the constitutional sense."'' In the second
class of cases, however, the Court did not regard the statutes in ques-
tion as regulating interstate commerce at all. They might operate be-
fore interstate commerce had begun, or after it had ceased, but they
did not regulate subject matter entrusted to Congress under the
Commerce Clause. As in the first class of cases, the opinions in the
186 US 380,390-91 (1902) (permitting state to restrict travel through quarantined areas); Smith v
St. Louis and Southwestern Railway Co, 181 US 248,257-58 (1901) (upholding quarantine stat-
ute); Rasmussen v Idaho, 181 US 198,201-02 (1901) (upholding statute forbidding shipment of
diseased cattle into the state); Morgan's Steamship Co v Louisiana Board of Health, 118 US 455
(1886) (upholding quarantine laws). Overly broad quarantines against cattle were by contrast in-
valid. See Railroad Co v Husen, 95 US 465,472 (1878) (prohibiting importation in response to a
minor threat of disease; a state "may not, under the cover of exerting its police powers, substan-
tially prohibit or burden either foreign or inter-state commerce," "beyond what is absolutely
necessary for its self-protection").
129 Munn v Illinois, 94 US 113, 135 (1877) (permitting state regulation of grain elevator
rates). See also, for example, Merrick v N.W. Halsey & Co, 242 US 568,585-86 (1917) (State blue
sky laws purporting to regulate only those who dealt in securities "within" the state sustained on
the ground that they affected interstate commerce only "incidentally," imposing only an "indi-
rect" burden.); Caldwell v Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co, 242 US 559 (1917) (upholding state blue
sky laws); Hall v Geiger-Jones Co, 242 US 539,557-58 (1917) (holding that a state may require
securities dealers to obtain licenses for sales in the state); Erie Railroad Co v Williams, 233 US
685,704 (1914) (New York statute requiring common carriers to pay their employees in cash on
a semi-monthly basis imposed only an "indirect burden" on interstate commerce and was accord-
ingly valid.).
130 Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railway Co v Texas, 210 US 217, 225 (1908)
("[N]ot every law that affects commerce among the States is a regulation of it in a constitutional
sense!'). See also The Winnebago, 205 US at 362 ("The State may pass laws enforcing the rights
of its citizens which affect interstate commerce but fall short of regulating such commerce in the
sense in which the Constitution gives exclusive jurisdiction to Congress."); New York, New Haven
and Hartford Railway Co v New York, 165 US 628,632 (1897) (State prohibition on internal fur-
naces on passenger cars was not "within the meaning of the Constitution a regulation of com-
merce, although it controls, in some degree, the conduct of those engaged in such commerce.");
Railroad Co, 95 US at 472 ("Many acts of a State may, indeed, affect commerce, without amount-
ing to a regulation of it, in the constitutional sense of the term."); Reading Railroad Co v Penn-
sylvania ("Railway Gross Receipts Tax Case"), 82 US (15 Wall) 284,293 (1872) ("Mt is not every-
thing that affects commerce that amounts to a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Consti-
tution."). See Gavit, The Commerce Clause at 21 (cited in note 72); Blewett H. Lee, Limitations
Imposed by the Federal Constitution on the Right of the States to Enact Quarantine Laws 1, 2 Harv
L Rev 267,279-80 (1889); John Norton Pomeroy, The Power of Congress to Regulate Inter-State
Commerce, 4 So L Rev 357, 359-60,390-93 (1879). See also Limitations Imposed by the Federal
Constitution on the Right of the States to Enact Quarantine Laws 11, 2 Harv L Rev 293, 314-15
(1889) (detailing legislation that fell short of "regulating," yet still "affected," commerce).
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second class might characterize such statutes as "affecting" interstate
commerce "incidentally," "indirectly," or "remotely." But here these
terms had a different significance. There was no suggestion in these
cases that these were matters over which Congress might assert its
regulatory authority. Such matters were "purely" or "essentially" "lo-
cal," subject solely to state and local regulation, beyond the reach of
the commerce power.
Chief among the areas in which these distinctions were felt were
licensing and taxation. The Court upheld a series of nondiscriminatory
licensing, privilege, occupation, and sales taxes that applied to local
sales of interstate goods only after they had come to rest in the desti-
nation state."' The Court similarly sustained nondiscriminatory state
and local taxation of property that had travelled in interstate com-
131 See, for example, Monamotor Oil Co v Johnson, 292 US 86,95 (1934) (upholding tax on
motor vehicle fuel that had "come to rest" in the taxing state); Magnano Co v Hamilton, 292 US
40,43 (1934) (upholding tax on oleomargarine "confined to sales within the state, and [having]
no application to sales of oleomargarine to be either imported or exported in interstate com-
merce"); East Ohio Gas Co v Tax Commission of Ohio, 283 US 465,471 (1931) (upholding privi-
lege tax on delivery of out-of-state natural gas to local consumers through local distribution sys-
tem, "a business of purely local concern exclusively within the jurisdiction of the State"); Gulf
Fisheries Co v Maclnerney, 276 US 124,126 (1928) (upholding a license tax on wholesale dealers
in fish, where the "fish have lost their alleged distinctive character as imports and have become,
through processing, handling and sale, a part of the mass of property subject to taxation by the
State"); Sonneborn Brothers v Cureton, 262 US 506,508 (1923) (upholding a state occupation tax
levied on wholesale dealers in oil that "had come to a state of rest" in the taxing state); Bowman,
256 US at 648-49 (upholding an excise tax on local sales of gasoline that had "passed beyond in-
terstate commerce"); Wagner v City of Covington, 251 US 95, 102 (1919) (upholding a nondis-
criminatory license tax applied to vendors distributing their goods from out-of-state manufactur-
ers to local merchants); Watters v Michigan, 248 US 65,66 (1918) (upholding a licensing require-
ment for door to door sales of goods "that were at rest in the State before the sale"); Dalton
Adding Machine Co v Virginia, 246 US 498,499 (1918) (upholding licensing tax on company sell-
ing machines "after their transportation in interstate commerce has been concluded and they
have become mingled with the general mass of property" in the taxing state); Rast v Van Deman
& Lewis Co, 240 US 342,360 (1916) (upholding a state special license tax on merchants engaged
in "essentially local sales"); Browning v City of Waycross, 233 US 16,22-23 (1914) (upholding oc-
cupation tax on the installation of lightning rods that had been shipped in interstate commerce
as one imposed on "the carrying on of a business of a strictly local character," "the doing of a lo-
cal act after interstate commerce had completely terminated," and "exclusively a local business,
subject to state control"); Banker Brothers Co v Pennsylvania,222 US 210,213 (1911) (upholding
a state tax on retail sales of automobiles that "had become at rest" in the taxing state); Kehrer v
Stewart, 197 US 60,68-69 (1905) (upholding a privilege tax on the domestic business of agents of
meat packing houses even when applied to goods shipped from another state); Cook v Marshall
County, 196 US 261, 274-75 (1905) (upholding local license tax on retail sales of cigarettes);
Pennsylvania Railroad Co v Knight, 192 US 21,28 (1904) (upholding privilege tax on "local" cab
service, "preliminary or subsequent to an interstate transportation," noting that "many things
have more or less close relation to interstate commerce, which are not properly to be regarded as
part of it"); Emert v Missouri, 156 US 296,321-22 (1895) (upholding nondiscriminatory license
tax on peddler having the goods in his possession and selling them without any previous order);
Machine Co v Gage, 100 US 676, 678-79 (1880) (upholding a nondiscriminatory state tax upon
all peddlers of sewing machines).
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merce but come to rest.' Such goods were no longer in or part of in-
terstate commerce. At the same time, the Justices permitted state taxa-
tion of goods that were destined to be shipped across state lines but
had not yet begun their interstate journeys.' Such licensing and taxing
statutes undoubtedly "affected" interstate commerce, but they did so
only "incidentally" or "indirectly."'3 Here again, "pragmatic" reasons
underwrote "formal" distinctions. As Justice Bradley explained in the
132 See, for example, Henneford v Silas Mason Co, 300 US 577,582 (1937) (upholding tax on
privilege of using property after it had come to rest in the taxing state and commerce was "at an
end"); Nashvill, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co v Wallace, 288 US 249,268 (1933) (uphold-
ing tax on storage and withdrawal of gasoline that had come to rest in the taxing state as impos-
ing a burden "too indirect and remote from the function of interstate commerce itself to trans-
gress constitutional limitations")- Gregg Dyeing Co v Query,286 US 472,481 (1932) (upholding a
property tax levied against gasoline that had "come to rest within the State" and was there "kept
for local purposes"); Texas Co, 258 US at 475 (upholding state inspection fees for gas and oil that
had "passed out of interstate commerce and [ ] come to rest within the State and become a part
of the general mass of property or ... the subject of domestic commerce").
133 See, for example, Edelman v Boeing Air Transport, 289 US 249,251 (1933) (upholding
tax on withdrawal from storage tanks of gasoline to be used to fuel interstate air transport); Utah
Power & Light Co v Pfost, 286 US 165, 177 (1932) (upholding a state tax on the production of
electricity within the state to be transmitted outside the state of production); Eastern Air Trans-
port v South Carolina Tax Commission, 285 US 147,153 (1932) (upholding tax on "purely local,"
"intrastate sales" of gasoline to an interstate air carrier as not "imposing a direct burden upon in-
terstate commerce"); Hope Natural Gas Co v Hall, 274 US 284, 288 (1927) (upholding state privi-
lege tax on production of natural gas destined to be shipped in interstate commerce); Lacoste v
Department of Conservation of Louisiana, 263 US 545,550-52 (1924) (upholding state severance
tax on animal pelts); Oliver Iron Mining Co v Lord, 262 US 172,178-79 (1923) (The Court up-
held a state occupation tax on coal mining even though the coal extracted was to be shipped out
of state to satisfy existing contracts, maintaining that "[m]ining is not interstate commerce, but,
like manufacturing, is a local business subject to local regulation and taxation .... Its character in
this regard is intrinsic, is not affected by the intended use or disposal of the product, is not con-
trolled by contractual engagements, and persists even though the business be conducted in close
connection with interstate commerce .... The ore does not enter interstate commerce until after
the mining is done .... The tax may indirectly and incidentally affect such commerce ... but this
is not a forbidden burden or interference."); Heisler, 260 US at 259 (holding that a state tax on
coal is not an interference with interstate commerce where the coal has not yet moved from the
place of preparation, although destined to be shipped out of state); American Manufacturing Co
v City of St. Louis, 250 US 459,463 (1919) (upholding municipal license fee on those manufactur-
ing goods in the city, measured by proceeds from sales); Diamond Match Co v Ontonagon, 188
US 82,96 (1903) (upholding a property tax assessed on logs stored within the state prior to their
exportation); Coe v Errol, 116 US 517, 525 (1886) (upholding a tax on timber cut and stored
within the state prior to shipment to another state, referring to the moment "in which they com-
mence their final movement for transportation from the State of their origin to that of their des-
tination" as the "point of time when they cease to be governed exclusively by the domestic law")
(emphasis added).
134 See, for example, Utah Power & Light, 286 US at 182 (upholding tax on generation of
electricity even though it may "indirectly and incidentally affect" interstate commerce); Oliver
Iron Mining, 262 US at 179 (upholding tax on iron mining that might affect interstate commerce
"indirectly and incidentally"); American Manufacturing, 250 US at 464 (upholding municipal tax
on manufacturing despite its "incidental and indirect effect" on commerce in the goods manufac-
tured); Armour & Co v Virginia, 246 US 1, 7 (1918) (upholding license tax on manufacture de-
spite its "indirect and wholly negligible influence on interstate commerce").
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leading case of Coe v Errol,'.. "It seems to us untenable to hold that a
crop or a herd is exempt from taxation merely because it is, by its
owner, intended for exportation. If such were the rule in many states
there would be nothing but the lands and real estate to bear the
taxes.""
The categories with which the states' powers of licensure and
taxation were rescued from dormant Commerce Clause attacks had a
similarly liberating effect on the exercise of the states' regulatory
powers. A growing national insurance industry was subject to regula-
tion by the several states in which they did business, because "the
business of insurance" was "not commerce," and "the contract of in-
surance" was "not an instrumentality of commerce. The making of
such a contract" was "a mere incident of commercial intercourse.
' ''7
Insurance contracts were "local transactions, governed by the local
law."' For as Justice White explained,
If the power to regulate interstate commerce applied to all the
incidents to which said commerce might give rise and to all con-
tracts which might be made in the course of its transaction, that
power would embrace the entire sphere of mercantile activity in
any way connected with trade between the States; and would ex-
clude state control over many contracts purely domestic in their
nature.'39
State inspection and labeling requirements imposed on a com-
modity produced within the regulating state but destined for interstate
markets likewise passed muster, as such regulations were enforced
"before [the commodity] bec[ame] an article of commerce" and thus
had only a "remote" effect upon such commerce."O State regulation of
intrastate rail carriage similarly won-the Court's approval. Local gas
135 116 US 517 (1886).
136 Id at 527-28.
137 Hooper v California, 155 US 648,655 (1894).
138 Paul v Virginia, 75 US (8 Wall) 168,183 (1869).
139 Hooper, 155 US at 655. For additional cases in which the Court has allowed states to
regulate insurance contracts, see Bothwell v Buckbe4 Mears Co, 275 US 274, 276-77 (1927);
Northwestern Life Insurance Co v Wisconsin, 247 US 132,138 (1918); New York Life Insurance
Co v Deer Lodge County, 231 US 495 (1913); Nutting v Massachusetts, 183 US 553 (1902); New
York Life Insurance Co v Cravens, 178 US 389 (1900); Philadelphia Fire Association v New York,
119 US 110 (1886); Liverpool Insurance Co v Massachusetts, 77 US (10 Wall) 566 (1871); Ducat v
Chicago, 77 US (10 Wall) 410 (1871). Concerning the power of states to regulate, license, and tax
foreign corporations doing an intrastate business within the state, see generally Gerard Carl
Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law (Harvard
1918).
140 See, for example, Turner v Maryland, 107 US 38,54,56 (1883) (allowing inspection of to-
bacco by states).
141 See Louisville & Nashville Railroad v Higdon, 234 US 592,600 (1914) (upholding a state
court's decision awarding damages against a railroad company that refused to provide service on
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companies selling natural gas piped in from outside the state to local
consumers were engaged in "local business," and regulation of their
rates related only "indirectly" to interstate commerce in natural gas."
2
A state law prohibiting tobacco advertising on billboards withstood
challenge because it regulated an "essentially local" activity.'3 State
statutes authorizing censorship of movies were likewise sustained, be-
cause interstate commerce had ended when the film had been deliv-
ered.'"
Activities of production-agriculture, mining, and manufactur-
ing-were paradigmatically local, and their regulation by the states af-
fected interstate commerce only indirectly.'4 A Virginia statute permit-
ting the planting of oysters in the beds of its tidewaters by state citi-
zens survived challenge because "the planting of oysters in the soil
covered by water" was "not different in principle from that of planting
corn upon dry land." The case presented "no question of transporta-
tion or exchange of commodities, but only of cultivation and produc-
tion. Commerce [had] nothing to do with land while producing, but
only with the product after it [had] become the subject of trade."
"[P]roductions [did] not spring from commerce, but commerce to
some extent from them."'4 Objections to Ohio statutes prohibiting the
manufacture of oleomargarine colored to look like butter were "mani-
festly without merit. All the acts of the corporation which were com-
plained of related to oleomargarine manufactured by it in the State of
Ohio," and the regulation therefore "affected the product manufac-
tured ... before it had become a subject of interstate commerce.' 4'
The Court similarly upheld a Mississippi statute prohibiting corpora-
tions engaged in the manufacture of cotton-seed oil from owning or
operating cotton gins except under certain prescribed conditions:
The separation of the seed from the fiber of the cotton which is
accomplished by the use of the cotton gin, is a short but impor-
tant step in the manufacture of both the seed and the fiber into
a railway spur at its published rate as having only an "indirect effect" on interstate commerce);
Arkadelphia Milling Co v St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co, 249 US 134,136 (1919) (permitting
rate regulation of lumber transport within same state).
142 Public Utilities Commission v Landon, 249 US 236,245-46 (1919).
143 Packer Corp v Utah, 285 US 105,112 (1932).
144 Mutual Film Corp v Hodges, 236 US 248, 258 (1915); Mutual Film Corp v Industrial
Commission of Ohio, 236 US 230,240-41 (1915).
145 See Prentice and Egan, The Commerce Clause at 54 (cited in note 72) (explaining the
distinction between manufacturing and commerce); Lewis, The Federal Power over Commerce at
4 (cited in note 72).
146 McCready v Virginia, 94 US 391, 396-97 (1877). See also Leonard & Leonard v Earle,
279 US 392,397 (1929) (upholding licensure and regulation of oyster-packing establishments as a
"business local in character" having "no such intimate connection with interstate commerce as to
exempt it from control by the State").
147 Capital City Dairy Co v Ohio, 183 US 238,245 (1902).
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useful articles of commerce, but... manufacture is not commerce.
... And the fact, of itsel that an article when in the process of
manufacture is intended for export to another State does not
render it an article of interstate commerce.... [T]he manufactur-
ing operations of the cotton gins ... precede but are not a part of
interstate commerce.
The Justices accordingly rejected the company's claim that the statute
imposed a "direct and substantial" burden on interstate commerce."
The Court similarly sustained an Oklahoma statute prohibiting waste-
ful production of petroleum, finding that it applied "only to produc-
tion and not to sales or transportation of crude oil or its products.
Such production is essentially a mining operation and therefore is not
a part of interstate commerce even though the product obtained is in-
tended to be and in fact is immediately shipped in such commerce......
In an era in which federal efforts to regulate intrastate activities
were the exception rather than the rule, the principal function of
locating such activities in the local sphere and holding that they
affected interstate commerce only indirectly was not to frustrate
federal regulation, but instead to insulate state and local regulatory
and taxing initiatives from dormant Commerce Clause attack." From
this vantage, we can see that formalism actually had, if anything, a pro-
regulation valence.
Consider one final production case. An Iowa statute enacted in
1884 prohibited the manufacture of intoxicating liquors except for
mechanical, medicinal, culinary, or sacramental purposes. J.S. Kidd was
charged with manufacturing and selling intoxicating liquor to be taken
out of the state and used as a beverage. He was convicted for violating
the statute, and his distillery was abated as a nuisance. On a writ of er-
ror to the Supreme Court, Kidd contended that the statute constituted
a regulation of commerce in violation of the Constitution.'
148 Crescent Cotton Oil Co v Mississippi, 257 US 129,136 (1921). See also Chassaniol v City
of Greenwood, 291 US 584, 587 (1934) (upholding local occupation tax on cotton buyers on
grounds that "[g]inning cotton, transporting it to Greenwood, and warehousing, buying and
compressing it there, are each, like the growing of it, steps in preparation for the sale and ship-
ment in interstate or foreign commerce. But each step prior to the sale and shipment is a transac-
tion local to Mississippi, a transaction in intrastate commerce"); Federal Compress & Warehouse
Co v McLean, 291 US 17,22 (1934) (upholding state license taxes on the operation of a cotton
compress and warehouse because "the privilege taxed is exercised before interstate commerce
begins, hence the burden of the tax upon the commerce is too indirect and remote to transgress
constitutional limitations").
149 Champlin Refining Co v Corporation Commission of Oklahoma,286 US 210,235 (1932).
150 The issue, to paraphrase Edward Corwin, Commerce Power at 194 (cited in note 5), was
between local regulation and no regulation.
151 Kidd v Pearson, 128 US 1 (1888).
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"The proposition that, supposing the goods were once lawfully
called into existence, it would then be beyond the power of the State
either to forbid or impede their exportation, may be conceded,"
'
52
wrote Justice Lamar for a unanimous Court. For "buying and selling
and the transportation incidental thereto constitute commerce; and
the regulation of commerce in the constitutional sense embraces the
regulation at least of such transportation."'' 3 But Kidd had been
charged not with unlawful sale or transportation of liquor, but instead
with its unlawful manufacture. And, as Lamar explained, "No distinc-
tion is more popular to the common mind, or more clearly expressed
in economic and political literature, than that between manufactures
and commerce. Manufacture is transformation-the fashioning of raw
materials into a change of form for use. The functions of commerce
are different."''M There was of course no doubt that restrictions on
manufacture would have an effect on interstate commerce in booze.
But while the statute's "effects may reach beyond the State by lessen-
ing the amount of intoxicating liquors exported," it did "not follow
that, because the products of a domestic manufacture may ultimately
become the subjects of interstate commerce, at the pleasure of the
manufacturer, the legislation of the State respecting such manufacture
is an attempted exercise of the power to regulate commerce exclu-
sively conferred upon Congress." For such a regulation did not "di-
rectly or materially affect . . . external commerce." It neither "im-
pose[d] a direct burden upon interstate commerce" nor "interfere[d]
directly with its freedom.'..
All of this reads as conventional nominalist analysis. But in a se-
quence of strikingly pragmatic passages, Lamar explained why it was
imperative to distinguish commerce from manufacture in Commerce
Clause analysis:
If it be held that the term [commerce] includes the regulation of
all such manufactures as are intended to be the subject of com-
mercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it
would also include all productive industries that contemplate the
same thing. The result would be that Congress would be invested,
to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate, not only
manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising,
domestic fisheries, mining-in short, every branch of human in-
dustry. For is there one of them that does not contemplate, more
or less clearly, an interstate or foreign market? Does not the
152 Id at 18.
153 Id at 20.
154 Id at 20.
155 Id at 22-23.
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wheat grower of the Northwest, and the cotton planter of the
South, plant, cultivate, and harvest his crop with an eye on the
prices at Liverpool, New York, and Chicago? The power being
vested in Congress and denied to the States, it would follow as an
inevitable result that the duty would devolve on Congress to
regulate all of these delicate, multiform and vital interests-
interests which in their nature are and must be, local in all the de-
tails of their successful management. '
"It is not necessary to enlarge on, but only to suggest the impractica-
bility of such a scheme, when we regard the multitudinous affairs in-
volved, and the almost infinite variety of their minute details," Lamar
continued.'" If all of these "delicate, multiform and vital" matters fell
only within congressional jurisdiction, the burden on Congress would
be insupportable. Congress could not simply enact "uniform legisla-
tion generally applicable throughout the United States," for "[a]ny
movement toward the establishment of rules of production in this vast
country, with its many different climates and opportunities, could only
be at the sacrifice of the peculiar advantages of a large part of the lo-
calities in it, if not of every one of them."' ' Instead, Congress would
have to enact "a swarm of statutes only locally applicable and utterly
inconsistent," which would "be about the widest possible departure
from the declared object" of the Commerce Clause.I" Moreover, Con-
gress would have to regulate not just "certain branches of industry,"
but "those instances in each and every branch where the producer con-
templated an interstate market. These instances would be almost infi-
nite. "'6 And as if this weren't bad enough, such an interpretation
would inevitably generate jurisdictional uncertainties and intergov-
ernmental tensions. For
still there would always remain the possibility, and often it would
be the case, that the producer contemplated a domestic market.
In that case the supervisory power must be executed by the State;
and the interminable trouble would be presented, that whether
the one power or the other should exercise the authority in ques-
tion would be determined, not by any general or intelligible rule,
but by the secret and changeable intention of the producer in
each and every act of production. A situation more paralyzing to
the state governments, and more provocative of conflicts between
156 Id at 21 (emphasis added). See also Kimball, 102 US at 697 ("[L]ocal" matters "can only
be properly regulated by provisions adapted to their special circumstances and localities").
157 Kidd, 128 US at 21 (emphasis added).
158 Id at 21-22 (emphasis added).
159 Id.
160 Id (emphasis added).
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the general government and the States, and less likely to have
been what the framers of the constitution intended, it would be
difficult to imagine.'64
Much of this language will seem familiar, if only because it is so
extensively quoted in Knight. 2 Indeed, Kidd v Pearson was the princi-
pal authority upon which the Knight Court relied in announcing that
"[c]ontracts, combinations, or conspiracies to control domestic enter-
prise in manufacture, agriculture, mining, production in all its forms, or
to raise or lower prices or wages, might unquestionably tend to re-
strain external as well as domestic trade, but the restraint would be an
indirect result, however inevitable and whatever its extent." For
"[s]light reflection will show that if the national power extends to all
contracts and combinations in manufacture, agriculture, mining, and
other productive industries, whose ultimate result may affect external
commerce, comparatively little of business operations and affairs
would be left for state control.'". Ift as Lamar and his colleagues evi-
dently maintained, the power to regulate commerce were exclusive," a
definition of commerce that included "local" productive enterprise
would have deprived states of the power to regulate such enterprise,
even in the absence of congressional action.'4 This would not merely
have worked a revolution in federalism-it would have been the sin-
gle greatest act of deregulation in American history. For the possibility
that congressional regulation sufficiently comprehensive to compen-
sate for the displacement of state and local police powers would be
forthcoming clearly appeared remote. But even in the unlikely event
that Congress did undertake such a herculean task, the Justices
doubted that the resulting codex could ever be sufficiently nuanced
not to "sacrifice the peculiar advantages" of localities with diverse
"climates and opportunities." Centralized authority could never bring
161 Id (emphasis added).
162 156 US at 14-15. See text accompanying notes 67-68.
163 156 US at 16.
164 As Fuller would write in Knight (after noting that the police power reserved by the
states was "essentially exclusive"), "On the other hand, the power of Congress to regulate com-
merce among the several States is also exclusive." Id at 11.
165 The possibility that production might have been considered a "mere aid to commerce"
within the meaning of Cooley, 52 US (12 How) at 230, and state and federal authority to regulate
production made concurrent, does not appear to have occurred to them. As Justice Brandeis
once complained of some of his colleagues to Felix Frankfurter, "What those fellows don't un-
derstand is that recognition of federal powers does not mean denial of state powers" Brandeis-
Frankfurter Conversations, Harvard Law School Library, quoted in Alexander M. Bickel, 9 His-
tory of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Judiciary and Responsible Government 1910-
21 556 (Macmillan 1984). This is precisely what they did not understand; or, put another way,
they understood precisely the opposite of what Brandeis maintained.
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about "successful management" of these "delicate, multiform, and vi-
tal interests.'
The Knight case and those that followed it were thus decided
against the backdrop of a well developed dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence-a jurisprudence whose "formalist" categories were
underwritten by a set of distinctively "realistic" concerns. '67 If "com-
merce among the several States" were to mean the same thing in af-
firmative and dormant Commerce Clause cases,1" the categories of
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence would have to be imported
into affirmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence if they were not to
be abandoned. This was recognized by a contemporary commentator,
who noted that
at the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 the differ-
ence between the direct and the indirect regulation of inter-state
and foreign commerce by the States had been well worked out by
the Supreme Court, and it had been settled by decision upon de-
cision ... that the indirect effect upon that commerce proceeding
from the regulation of its incidents by the States was not obnox-
ious to the Constitution, provided the regulation was reasonable
and not discriminative, however great that effect might be. It was
not the degree of the effect, but the nature of the regulation
which determined whether the State law was valid or invalid. Af-
ter the passage of the Sherman Act the Supreme Court at once
perceived the relation of this principle to the analogous question,
whether only direct or also indirect and incidental restraint of
that commerce was obnoxious to the Act; and it was decided
upon reference to the cases which had sustained the power of the
States to indirectly regulate commerce ... that only such con-
tracts and combinations as directly, and not such as indirectly, re-
strained commerce were obnoxious to the Act.1"
166 Compare H.P Hood & Sons Inc v Du Mond, 336 US 525,545-46 (1949) (Black dissent-
ing) ("[I]t is inconceivable that Congress could pass uniform national legislation capable of ad-
justment and application to all the local phases of interstate activities that take place in the 48
states").
167 See Ribble, State and National Power at 192-94 (cited in note 72) (noting that both the
doctrine of Coe v Errol and the idea that manufacture or production is not commerce "derived
from a recognition of the needs of the states for sources of revenue, and their proper claim to
control of local affairs").
168 Here, perhaps, was the great "formalism," though such insistence on consistency of
meaning in the construction of a single clause of the Constitution is hardly irregular.
169 D.W. Brown, The Concurrent Power of the States to Regulate Inter-State and Foreign
Commerce, 5 Colum L Rev 298,306-07 (1905). See also Knight, 156 US at 16 ("[l1n Kidd v. Pear-
son the refusal of a State to allow articles to be manufactured within her borders even for export
was held not to directly affect external commerce, and state legislation which, in a great variety
of ways, affected interstate commerce and persons engaged in it, has been frequently sustained
because the interference was not direct."); Fiss, 8 History of the Supreme Court at 110 (cited in
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Affirmative Commerce Clause doctrine during this period, then,
was the flip side of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. And that jurisprudence, as the cases make clear, was driven by
frankly instrumental impulses: to secure a national market for the
products of an increasingly vibrant and integrated economy, while at
the same time preserving state and local prerogatives to regulate
business in an era of comparative federal lassitude.' The relative sta-
bility of this body of jurisprudence over a period of nearly four dec-
ades testifies to the degree to which the balance it struck between
state and federal regulatory competence satisfied Americans of the
era."' The nationwide economic crisis of the 1930s witnessed a dra-
matic increase in the regulatory initiative of the federal government,
and both the established federal equilibrium and the jurisprudence
that prescribed and described it came to be seen as anachronistic and
unsatisfactory. While these developments no doubt prompted its
abandonment, they are hardly warrant for the view that "formalism"
was simply the jurisprudential creed of dim-witted stooges for laissez-
far. 172fakre.
II. SOME FORMALISM ABOUT REALISM
While "formalism" may have been conceived as a principled
means of maintaining the optimal allocation of regulatory authority in
an expanding yet diverse economy, "formalist" opinions certainly read
differently from their "realist" counterparts. Consider, for example,
Justice Holmes's opinion for a unanimous Court in Swift and Co v
United States.'73 Introducing the stream of commerce doctrine in up-
holding the application of the Sherman Act to a conspiracy to restrain
trade in livestock in the Chicago stockyards, Holmes opined that
note 96).
170 See Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom at 50-51 (cited in note 96) ("With consis-
tent caution the Court refused to adopt extreme doctrine as to the 'exclusive' range of national
commerce power, in years when it was politically most unlikely that Congress would fill the gap
left by the end of state regulations.").
171 While the categories of "formalism" had their roots in instrumental concerns, this is not
to say that the cases continued regularly to manifest signs of self-conscious instrumentalism
throughout the "formalist" period. It should come as no surprise that one finds more instrumen-
tal language in the germinal cases in which the categories were forged and justified than in later
cases in which the categories were simply applied. As F.D.G. Ribble put it, "[F]rom results come
formulations, and the formulations may control, even after their bases are lost sight of Activities
which have been called intrastate commerce will normally continue to be so called, as will other
activities which bear to them some pronounced similarity." Ribble, State and National Power at
201 (cited in note 72).
172 See Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney and Waite 76
(Quadrangle 1964) (arguing that the wide discretion which formalist categories permitted was
employed to achieve laissez-faire results).
173 196 US 375 (1905).
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"commerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a
practical one, drawn from the course of business."' 7 In Stafford v Wal-
lace,' Chief Justice Taft maintained that the Court's embrace of the
stream of commerce doctrine
was the result of the natural development of interstate commerce
under modem conditions. It was the inevitable recognition of the
great central fact that such streams of commerce from one part
of the country to another which are ever flowing are in their very
essence the commerce among the States and with foreign nations
which historically it was one of the chief purposes of the Consti-
tution to bring under national protection and control. This court
declined to defeat this purpose in respect of such a stream and
take it out of complete national regulation by a nice and techni-
cal inquiry into the non-interstate character of some of its neces-
sary incidents and facilities when considered alone and without
reference to their association with the movement of which they
were an essential but subordinate part.'76
Taft concluded,
Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threat-
ens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate
commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the
commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and
decide the fact of the danger and meet it. This court will certainly
not substitute its judgment for that of Congress in such a matter
unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its
effect upon it are clearly non-existent.'7
That language sounds distinctively "realistic." Let us therefore be
"realistic" ourselves. Realism counsels us to pay attention not just to
the language in the opinions, but to the way the cases come out as
well. But before we can appreciate what we will discover through such
an investigation, we must first peek over the hedge to see what was
going on in due process jurisprudence.
As we have seen, the division of the world into national and local
spheres provided the framework for the Court's federalism jurispru-
dence during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A simi-
lar division of the world into public and private spheres supplied the
organizing principle for the Court's substantive due process jurispru-
dence during the same period. This principle was manifest in several
174 Id at 398.
175 258 US 495 (1922).
176 Id at 518-19.
177 Id at 521.
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contexts; '8 here I want to focus on just one. Until 1934, most busi-
nesses were characterized as private, and the prices at which they sold
their goods or provided their services, as well as many aspects of their
employment relations, could not be regulated by the state. Only a
small group of businesses "affected with a public interest" could be
subjected to such control. Grain elevators," railroads,'s fire insur-
ance, '8 water utilities,"8 certain oil pipelines,"' public stockyards,'8' the
Chicago Board of Trade,n and a very few other businesses"6 fell into
this select class; all others fell outside it.'87Attempts to subject private
businesses to such regulation violated parties' freedom to contract,
then found in substantive readings of the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In short, the "formalist" division
of the world into public and private realms created a restraint parallel
to that imposed on the federal and state governments by the lo-
cal/national dichotomy of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Now we can return to Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and see
the ways in which it interacted with these due process limitations to
constrain federal power. Before 1937, the Court upheld national regu-
lation of "local" activities on the ground that they occurred in a
stream of interstate commerce on only four occasions. Three of those
178 For a general discussion, see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court ch 3 (Ox-
ford 1998).
179 See, for example, Brass v Stoeser, 153 US 391 (1894); Budd v New York, 143 US 517
(1892); Munn v Illinois, 94 US 113 (1877).
180 See, for example, Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Co v Wellman, 143 US 339 (1892);
Dow v Beidelman, 125 US 680 (1888); Stone v Farmers' Loan & Trust Co ("Railroad Commission
Cases"), 116 US 307 (1886); Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Co v Ackley, 94 US 179
(1877); Peik v Chicago and North-Western Railway Co, 94 US 164 (1877); Chicago, Burlington
and Quincy Railroad Co v Iowa, 94 US 155 (1877).
181 See, for example, O'Gorman & Young Inc v Hartford Fire Insurance Co, 282 US 251
(1931); German Alliance Insurance Co v Lewis, 233 US 389 (1914).
182 See, for example, Van Dyke v Geary, 244 US 39 (1917); Spring Valley Water Works v
Schottler, 110 US 347 (1884).
183 See, for example, Producers Transportation Co v Railroad Commission of California, 251
US 228 (1920); The Pipe Line Cases, 234 US 548 (1914).
184 See, for example, Tagg Brothers & Moorhead v United States,280 US 420 (1930); Stafford
v Wallace, 258 US 495 (1922); Cotting v Kansas City Stock Yards Co, 183 US 79 (1901).
185 See Chicago Board of Trade v Olsen, 262 US 1 (1923).
186 See Block v Hirsh, 256 US 135 (1921) (temporary residential rent control in District of
Columbia during post-WWl housing crunch); Terminal Taxicab Co v Kutz, 241 US 252 (1916)
(certain aspects of taxicab business).
187 See, for example, Williams v Standard Oil Co, 278 US 235 (1929) (petroleum sales); Rib-
nik v McBride, 277 US 350 (1928) (employment agencies); Tyson & Brother v Banton, 273 US
418 (1927) (ticket brokerage); Dorchy v Kansas, 264 US 286 (1924) (coal mining industry); Wolff
Packing Co v Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas, 262 US 522 (1923) (meat packing indus-
try); Adkins v Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 US 525 (1923) (hospitals); Ad-




cases involved transactions in a public stockyards;' * the fourth in-
volved transactions on the Chicago Board of Trade. ' Each of these
businesses was affected with a public interest, as the Court made ex-
plicit in its opinions. ' In practice (and in theory),"' only those "local"
enterprises "affected with a public interest" could be located in a
stream of interstate commerce and thereby subjected to federal regu-
lation. Cabined by this due process constraint, the stream of com-
merce thus cut an exceedingly narrow swath. As far as results were
concerned, the stream of commerce cases stood for the proposition
that the federal government could regulate transactions in major pub-
lic stockyards and on the Chicago Board of Trade. Before the mid-
1930s, Congress simply did not attempt to push the theory any further.
Taft's expansive dicta in Stafford must be understood against this
backdrop. He was of course not saying that Congress could do what-
ever it liked. He was instead saying only that Congress could do what-
ever, in light of the settled understandings of the day, it was likely to
do.
Now let's take a similar look at the Shreveport decision. The oft-
quoted passage states that Congress's
authority, extending to these interstate carriers as instruments of
interstate commerce, necessarily embraces the right to control
their operations in all matters having such a close and substantial
relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appro-
priate to the security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the inter-
state service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which
interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and
without molestation or hindrance. As it is competent for Con-
gress to legislate to these ends, unquestionably it may seek their
attainment by requiring that the agencies of interstate commerce
shall not be used in such manner as to cripple, retard, or destroy
it. The fact that carriers are instruments of intrastate commerce, as
well as of interstate commerce, does not derogate from the com-
plete and paramount authority of Congress over the latter or
preclude the Federal power from being exerted to prevent the in-
trastate operation of such carriers from being made a means of
injury to that which has been confided to Federal care. Wherever
the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related
that the government of the one involves the control of the other, it
188 See Tagg Brothers, 280 US at 436-39; Stafford, 258 US at 519; Swift and Co, 196 US at
396-98.
189 See Chicago Board of Trade, 262 Us at 33.
190 See id at 40-41; Stafford, 258 US at 516-17.
191 See Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at ch 9 (cited in note 178).
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is Congress, and not the State, that is entitled to prescribe the final
and dominant rule, for otherwise Congress would be denied the
exercise of its constitutional authority and the State, and not the
Nation, would be supreme within the national field.... Congress
in the exercise of its paramount power may prevent the common
instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial inter-
course from being used in their intrastate operations to the injury
of interstate commerce. This is not to say that Congress possesses
the authority to regulate the internal commerce of a State, as
such, but that it does possess the power to foster and protect in-
terstate commerce, and to take all measures necessary or appro-
priate to that end, although intrastate transactions of interstate
carriers may thereby be controlled. '
The first thing to be noted about this passage is that Hughes does
not ground federal power to regulate rates for intrastate carriage
solely in their effect on interstate commerce. Throughout this passage
he repeatedly emphasizes that it is the intrastate operations of "agen-
cies" or "instruments" of interstate commerce that are being regu-
lated. That is, he focuses not just on the activity regulated, but also on
the interstate nature of the entity regulated. And no one could doubt
that the railroads were in fact instruments of interstate commerce, for
they actually physically carried people and goods across state lines.
More important, however, is the nature of the regulation in ques-
tion. Congress could regulate the rates for intrastate carriage, the
Court held, because of their relation to rates for interstate carriage. In-
trastate carriage competed with interstate carriage; Congress had
power to regulate the rates charged for interstate carriage; ergo, Con-
gress had power to regulate the rates charged for intrastate carriage.
Of course, Congress had power to regulate rates for interstate carriage
(and therefore for intrastate carriage) only because the business of
rail carriage was affected with a public interest."' Congress's power to
regulate this aspect of interstate carriage, and its corollary power to
regulate this aspect of intrastate carriage, was wholly dependent upon
the public nature of the business regulated.
Shreveport thus did not grant Congress a license to regulate every
kind or even many kinds of intrastate activity that might have an ef-
fect (competitive or otherwise) on interstate commerce. Given con-
temporary Fifth Amendment constraints, it could not have done so
192 234 US at 351-53 (emphasis added). This passage, in variously edited forms, is repro-
duced in Cohen and Varat, Constitutional Law at 187 (cited in note 23); in Gunther and Sullivan,
Constitutional Law at 167 (cited in note 2); and in Stone, et al, Constitutional Law at 197 (cited in
note 1).
193 See notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
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without simultaneously working a revolution in substantive due proc-
ess jurisprudence. Instead, Shreveport more modestly recognized fed-
eral power to regulate the intrastate rates charged by an interstate
business affected with a public interest. So long as the power of Con-
gress to regulate interstate rates remained confined to businesses af-
fected with a public interest, its derivative power to regulate intrastate
rates would remain similarly confined. The due process context of
Shreveport thus severely constrained the range of its application to in-
trastate matters. Here again, unless we restore Shreveport to its due
process environment, we cannot appreciate its meaning. For if you
Shepardize Shreveport, you will find that every case following it from
its announcement in 1914 up to the mid-1930s involved regulation of a
business affected with a public interest: railroads.'"
To be sure, the stream of commerce and Shreveport doctrines of-
fered ways of thinking about the relationship between local and inter-
state economic activity that threatened to disrupt the symmetry of a
jurisprudence grounded in the categories of dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. But until the mid-1930s, that disruption was exceed-
ingly modest in scope. Operating against the background constraints
imposed by the Due Process Clause, these "realistic" precedents stood
for the proposition that the federal government might regulate a lim-
ited set of otherwise local activities: transactions on major public
stockyards and grain exchanges, and intrastate rail carriage. Like their
"formalist" cousins, these "realistic" decisions identified categories of
activity subject to federal control.
The "realistic" cases, then, might have engaged in some pretty big
talk; but all of it was uttered from behind the skirts of "formalism."
Ripped from their contexts, these utterances appear strikingly "realis-
tic." But they were at best examples of locker room realism.
194 The first Supreme Court decision following Shreveport outside the railroad context was
NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1 (1937) (permitting Congress to regulate labor
relations in the steel industry). Beginning in 1934, the lower federal courts began to apply
Shreveport in other contexts as well. See, for example, United States v Edwards, 14 F Supp 384 (S
D Cal 1936) (fruit packaging); R.G C.way Coal Co v Glenn, 12 F Supp 570 (W D Ky 1935) (coal
mining); United States v Wilshire Oil Co, 9 F Supp 396 (S D Cal 1934) (petroleum refining);
United States v Canfield Lumber Co, 7 F Supp 694,699 (D Neb 1934) (lumber sales); Richmond
Hosiery Mills v Camp, 7 F Supp 139 (N D Ga 1934) (hosiery manufacturers); United States v
Shissler, 7 F Supp 123,127 (N D Ill 1934) (milk distribution); United States v Gregg, 5 F Supp 848
(S D Texas 1934). Some examples of railroad regulation cases following Shreveport include Ohio
v United States, 292 US 498 (1934); Florida v United States, 292 US 1 (1934); United States v Lou-
isiana, 290 US 70 (1933); Alabama v United States, 279 US 229 (1929); Colorado v United States,
271 US 153 (1926); United States v Village of Hubbard, 266 US 474 (1925); Dayton-Goose Creek
Railway Co v United States, 263 US 456 (1924); Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co, 257 US 563 (1922); Illinois Central Railroad Co v Public Utili-
ties Commission of Illinois, 245 US 493 (1918); American Express Co v Caldwell, 244 US 617
(1917).
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III. REALISM UNBOUND
The "formalist" restraint on these "realist" formulations dissolved
in 1934. In Nebbia v New York, '95 the Court held that the Due Process
Clause demanded "only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbi-
trary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained."M The term
"affected with a public interest" now meant no more than "subject to
the exercise of the police power•... Of course, every business was sub-
ject to reasonable exercises of the police power. Accordingly, the ma-
jority concluded that "there is no closed class or category of busi-
nesses affected with a public interest.... The phrase 'affected with a
public interest' can, in the nature of things, mean no more than that an
industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public
good." '98
The removal of this due process limitation on congressional legis-
lation opened vast new frontiers for federal regulation. The stream of
commerce, previously narrowly channeled, could now overflow its
former banks to justify a flood of federal control. And so, for example,
attorneys defending the constitutionality of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act selected as test cases disputes at manufacturing plants that
brought in most of their raw materials from outside the state and
shipped their finished products in interstate commerce. These for-
merly "private" enterprises, they could now plausibly contend, stood
astride a stream of interstate commerce. ' Such broad stream of com-
merce arguments would continue to figure prominently in argument,
commentary, and judicial decision throughout the late 1930s."'
Yet Nebbia's ramifications for Commerce Clause jurisprudence
were confined to those contexts in which the due process limitation
had constrained the scope of a Commerce Clause formulation. Char-
acterizing a previously "private" business as "public," for example, did
195 291 US 502 (1934).
196 Id at 525.
197 Id at 533. For an extensive discussion of Nebbia, its antecedents, and its ramifications, see
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court (cited in note 178).
198 Nebbia, 291 US at 536.
199 See NLRB v Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co, 301 US 58, 72 (1937) (applying
NLRA to clothes manufacturing company using wholly imported cloth); NLRB v Fruehauf
Trailer Co, 301 US 49 (1937) (applying NLRA to trailer manufacturers receiving most parts from
out-of-state suppliers and shipping most goods in interstate commerce); NLRB v Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1 (1937) (applying NLRA to steel industry). For a discussion of the
selection of the test cases, and the briefing and arguing of those cases on the current of com-
merce theory, see Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 162-68 (cited in note 178); Peter
Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 254-72 (Princeton 1982).
200 For discussion of the role that the stream of commerce doctrine played in the litigation
of the Labor Board Cases of 1937 and in NLRB v Fainblatt, 306 US 601, 605-06 (1939), see
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 162-82,184-89 (cited in note 178).
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not change the fact that the activity was 'conducted at a terminal of,
rather than amidst, a stream of interstate commerce. Such activities
had lain outside federal regulatory competence not merely because
they were "private," but because they were essentially "local"-and
Nebbia did nothing to alter that status. Thus, while the abandonment
of the public/private limitation in due process doctrine allowed much
broader play to the "realist" Commerce Clause formulations which it
had previously constrained, "realism's" emancipation did not herald
"formalism's" immediate demise. As the opportunities presented by
Nebbia channeled congressional regulation into new forms that
tapped the expanded range of the Shreveport doctrine, it became de-
creasingly necessary to confront the continuing vitality of "formalis-
tic" doctrinal formulations. For a brief period after 1934, then, the
Knight and the Nebbia-enhanced "realist" lines of authority could
continue to enjoy an increasingly strained but nonetheless manage-
able coexistence.
Thus, even a swollen current of commerce could not support the
constitutionality of the Live Poultry Code of the National Industrial
Recovery Act. Once the poultry arrived at the Schechters' Brooklyn
slaughterhouse, "it had come to a permanent rest within the State." As
it would not continue in interstate commerce, the stream of commerce
cases were "not applicable."20' The decision's unanimity underscored
the continuing thrall in which the Court's affirmative Commerce
Clause jurisprudence was held by the categories developed in service
of the Clause's negative implications. Ten years earlier, the Court had
turned back a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a New York
statute regulating the sale of kosher meats. The Court had found that
the meat had come to a permanent rest within the state and was held
solely for local disposition and use. Accordingly, it was subject to state
regulation, notwithstanding the fact that the regulation might "inci-
dentally affect interstate commerce." Such regulation imposed no "di-
rect burden" on interstate commerce.m State regulations of local ko-
sher butchering affected interstate commerce only "incidentally" and
were accordingly constitutional; a fortiori, the wages, hours, and sales
practices of local kosher butchers affected interstate commerce only
"indirectly" and were beyond the reach of federal regulation.Y
2
201 Schechter Poultry, 295 US at 543.
202 Hygrade Provision Co v Sherman, 266 US 497,502-03 (1925).
203 Even Learned Hand, the paragon of judicial restraint, see Gerald Gunther, Learned
Hand The Man and the Judge (Knopf 1994), could not avoid the conclusion that the wage and
hour regulations exceeded federal power. See United States v A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp, 76
F2d 617,624-25 (2d Cir 1935) (Hand concurring) ("ITIhe regulation of the hours and wages of
all local employees, who turn the fowls into merchantable poultry after they have become a part
of the domestic stock of goods, seems to me so different in degree as to be beyond the line [of
congressional power].").
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As Justice Sutherland's opinion for the majority pointed out,
Carter Coal presented the same question, but at the opposite terminal
of the current of commerce. "In the Schechter case," he wrote, "the
flow had ceased. Here it had not begun. The difference is not one of
substance. The applicable principle is the same."'" In an opinion lit-
tered with citations to and quotations from dormant Commerce
Clause cases, the Court held that the wages, hours, and other employ-
ment conditions of employees engaged in mining coal were "local"
matters beyond the reach of federal authority. 5 After all, the Court
had recently upheld state taxation or regulation of coal mining, iron
mining, oil production, and production of electricity against claims
that it violated the dormant Commerce Clause.2 What was sauce for
the goose was sauce for the gander.
Yet portions of the decision pointed out new avenues of regula-
tory opportunity. The members of the Carter majority invalidated the
price-fixing provisions of the Act solely on the grounds that they were
inseparable from the offending labor provisions.' They therefore did
not dispute Chief Justice Hughes when, writing separately, he main-
tained that those provisions, if considered separately, were valid. Rely-
ing on Nebbia, the Chief Justice maintained, "We are not at liberty to
deny to the Congress, with respect to interstate commerce, a power
commensurate with that enjoyed by the States in the regulation of
their internal commerce."m Justice Cardozo agreed. "Prices in inter-
state transactions may not be regulated by the states. They must there-
fore be subject to the power of the nation unless they are to be with-
drawn altogether from governmental supervision."2 Nor did the ma-
jority dispute Cardozo's contention that the federal government pos-
sessed power to regulate the price of intrastate sales of coal as well.
Relying explicitly on Shreveport and its progeny, Cardozo maintained
that "[w]ithin rulings the most orthodox, the prices for intrastate sales
of coal have so -inescapable a relation to those for interstate sales that
a system of regulation for transactions of the one class is necessary to
give adequate protection to the system of regulation adopted for the
other.210
204 Carter Coal, 298 US at 306.
205 Id at 308.
206 Champlin Refining Co v Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 US 210 (1932);
Utah Power & Light Co v Pfost, 286 US 165 (1932); Oliver Iron Mining Co v Lord, 262 US 172
(1923); Heisler v Thomas Colliery Co, 260 US 245 (1922).
207 Carter Coal, 298 US at 312-16.
208 Id at 319.
209 Id at 326 (citation omitted). Cardozo similarly maintained that Nebbia dispelled any
Fifth Amendment doubts as to the power of Congress to regulate the price of coal. Id at 330-32.
210 Id at 328-29 (emphasis added). Cardozo contended that the company had as yet sus-
tained no injury under the labor provisions of the Act, and accordingly would have dismissed its
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Such a ruling would certainly not have been orthodox before
Nebbia. The coal business had up to that time been considered a pri-
vate business not affected with a public interest.1' The Fifth Amend-
ment would therefore have precluded federal regulation of the price
at which coal was sold in interstate commerce. Unable to regulate the
price of such interstate sales, Congress could not have looked to
Shreveport for authority to regulate the price of intrastate sales. But in
1934, the lower federal courts began linking Shreveport and Nebbia in
cases upholding federal regulation of intrastate prices. 2 Congress also
quickly grasped Nebbia's implications. Drawing now on the line of au-
thority that held that "buying and selling and the transportation inci-
dental thereto constitute commerce,, 21 1 the national legislature
changed its strategy to one of regulating interstate marketing rather
than local production. The result was a new wave of statutes extending
federal control over intrastate transactions.
In the spring of 1937, Congress enacted a new Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act. Congress no longer sought to regulate labor rela-
tions and conditions in the coal business, but it did still seek to control
both the interstate and the intrastate prices of coal. Moreover, it did
so, following Cardozo's Carter dissent, "within rulings the most ortho-
dox." The bill's sponsors reasoned that Congress could regulate sales
in interstate commerce, and the Due Process Clause no longer pre-
cluded that regulation including a specification of the price. Moreover,
intrastate coal competed with interstate coal; accordingly, following
Shreveport, it was necessary and proper for Congress to regulate the
214price of coal sold intrastate. When the statute was challenged in 1940,
only Justice McReynolds dissented from the opinion upholding it.
2
1'
In 1938, Congress sought to support and stabilize prices in speci-
fied agricultural commodities by limiting the amount that producers
could market. When the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938 regulating tobacco sales were challenged in 1939, the
Court upheld them as a legitimate regulation of interstate marketing.
Yet the assigned marketing quotas also necessarily limited the amount
of tobacco that a producer could sell in intrastate commerce as well.
attack on those provisions on ripeness grounds. As to the validity or invalidity of those provi-
sions, Cardozo insisted, "No opinion is expressed either directly or by implication as to those as-
pects of the case." Id at 324.
211 See Dorchy v Kansas, 264 US 286,289 (1924) (forbidding state regulation of labor rela-
tions at a mine).
212 See, for example, United States v Shissler, 7 F Supp 123, 126-27 (N D ill 1934) (permit-
ting regulation of milk distributors); United States v Spotless Dollar Cleaners, 6 F Supp 725,730
(S D NY 1934).
213 Knight, 156 US at 14.
214 See Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 193-96,204-05 (cited in note 178).
215 See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co v Adkins, 310 US 381 (1940).
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The Court responded by turning to Shreveport. "[A]t least two-thirds
of all flue-cured tobacco sold at auction warehouses is sold for imme-
diate shipment to an interstate or foreign destination," wrote Justice
Roberts. "In markets where tobacco is sold to both interstate and in-
trastate purchasers it is not known, when the grower places his to-
bacco on the warehouse floor for sale, whether it is destined for inter-
state or intrastate commerce. Regulation to be effective, must, and
therefore may constitutionally, apply to all sales.
'216
Similarly, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act authorized
the Secretary of Agriculture to set minimum prices at which proces-
sors could purchase certain agricultural commodities, such as milk,
from producers. Here again, the Act's sponsors reasoned that Con-
gress's power to regulate interstate buying and selling included the
power to set the price of such interstate sales. Observing that large
metropolitan markets included both interstate and intrastate milk, the
Act's backers reasoned that the intrastate milk competed with inter-
state milk in the same way that intrastate rail carriage had competed
with its interstate counterpart in Shreveport. In order for the fixing of
minimum producer prices for interstate milk to be effective, they con-
cluded, equivalent prices for the intrastate milk with which it com-
peted would have to be established as well. The Court accepted these
arguments, upholding the Act in United States v Rock Royal Co-
217 1operative, Inc ' and H.P Hood & Sons, Inc v United States in 1939.
And in 1942, the Court relied heavily on Shreveport's competition
doctrine when it upheld federal regulation of the price of milk that
was purchased in the state of its production and sold solely within the
state. The Wrightwood Dairy didn't even handle interstate milk. It was
not an "agency" or "instrument" of interstate commerce; it was not
even engaged in interstate commerce. Yet the fact that its intrastate
milk competed with interstate milk was sufficient to warrant federal
regulation of its prices. 9
By the spring of 1942, Court watchers were reeling. Nebbia's lib-
eration of the Shreveport doctrine unleashed a federal regulatory
power that appeared competent to address almost all of the nation's
economic ills. Editors at the Columbia Law Review, for example, rec-
216 Mulford v Smith, 307 US 38,47 (1939). For a discussion of the legislative history of the
Act and its defense before the Court, see Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 196-203
(cited in note 178). The Court relied in part on Currin v Wallace, 306 US 1, 11 (1939), in which
the Court had upheld provisions of the Tobacco Inspection Act of 1935, relying on Shreveport in
subjecting both interstate and intrastate sales of tobacco to the Act's inspection provisions. See
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 190-93 (cited in note 178).
217 307 US 533 (1939).
218 307 US 588 (1939).
219 United States v Wrightwood Dairy, 315 US 110 (1942). See Cushman, Rethinking the New
Deal Court at 203-07 (cited in note 178).
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ognized that the logic of Shreveport's competition doctrine had no ob-
vious limits:
Since, theoretically, the standard of [the milk cases] could make
interstate and intrastate commerce coextensive, as every product
on the market competes with every other for a portion of the to-
tal demand, the obvious problem in applying the new concept is
to discover within what bounds the effects of actual competition
will be given legal significance."'
"The implications of the 'competition' doctrine, if carried to their logi-
cal extreme, would result in a complete withdrawal of the Supreme
Court from its position as a check upon Congressional action under
the commerce clause. ' .. Members of the nation's highest court would
soon be thinking along similar lines.
IV. THE END OF REALISM
The removal of the due process limitations that had defined the
scope of the stream of commerce and Shreveport doctrines thus had
far-reaching ramifications for the ambit of federal regulatory power.
By focusing its recovery efforts on the marketing rather than the pro-
duction of coal and farm commodities, Congress was able to address
the problems of the energy and agricultural sectors with programs
that could withstand judicial scrutiny. But the constitutional success of
these initiatives papered over lingering "formalist" restraints on fed-
eral power. For as Carter Coal had demonstrated, Nebbia had done
nothing to bring productive activities located at the source of the
stream of commerce within the domain of federal regulation.2' In fact,
as intracurial records illustrate, the Justices continued to analyze regu-
lations of production within the categorical framework derived from
the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. But Congress
was not long content to regulate marketing alone, and so the inevita-
ble confrontation between the "formalist" and the unshackled "real-
ist" styles came in the spring of 1942. Rather than awarding victory to
either interpretive mode, however, the Court selected a third option
that reoriented both affirmative and dormant Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence.
220 Recent Decisions: Constitutional Law-Effect of Competition of intrastate Commerce on
Interstate Commerce as Justifying Regulation of Former, 42 Colum L Rev 694, 696 (1942). See
also Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce Clause-Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937,8 U Pitt L Rev 139,140 (1942) ("Conceivably any wholly intrastate activity competes with
a similar interstate activity.").
221 42 Colum L Rev at 699 (cited in note 220).
222 See text accompanying notes 207-11.
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The amended Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 authorized
the Secretary of Agriculture to allocate among the nation's farmers
the number of acres of certain staple crops they would be permitted to
market without penalty. Provisions of the Act penalized production of
crops on acreage in excess of that allotted, unless the excess was
stored in compliance with regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
Roscoe Filburn was penalized for violating these provisions. Filburn
had marketed the harvest from his allotted acreage, but rather than
storing the excess as prescribed, he had reserved all of his surplus
wheat for use and consumption on his own farm. The government con-
tended that the prohibition on production of wheat for home con-
sumption was a regulation of "marketing,.. but Justice Robert Jack-
son, to whom the opinion was assigned, saw it as a regulation "of pro-
duction not for commerce either actually or in contemplation,"' 4 an
activity "neither interstate nor commerce."2
m
After initial argument in early May of 1942, Jackson prepared
two draft opinions. Each of them took a "realistic," empirical approach
to the case. And in each the Court would have remanded the case to
the trial court for additional factual findings through which the Court
might determine whether the requisite effect on interstate commerce
existed.m
In the first draft Jackson remarked that "[tjhe stipulated facts-
the only evidence in the case-are of no material assistance in deter-
mining the validity of the Government's contention .... The constitu-
tional issue involved is of the greatest magnitude, and we are of opin-
ion that we should not pass upon it in the present state of the record,
without the benefit of findings and consideration by the court below
or a full presentation of the controlling economic facts relied upon."
In the second draft Jackson again maintained that "the record in
this case does not afford sufficient basis for a decision under the
commerce clause. ,... "Perhaps," he wrote,
[W]e could assume in the present case without proof that if a
farmer is not permitted to feed his own wheat to his livestock he
223 See Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111, 119 (1942).
224 Memorandum for Mr. Costelloe, Re Wickard Case, 1 (June 19, 1942), Box 125, Jackson
MSS, LC ("Memorandum for Costelloe I") (copy on file with author).
225 Robert H. Jackson to Harlan Fiske Stone, Re Wickard case, 1 (May 25, 1942), Box 125,
Jackson MSS, LC ("Wickard letter I") (copy on file with author). See also Wickard, 317 US at
119-20.
226 Wickard,317 US at ill.
227 Opinion draft, Wickard v Filbum, No 1080 (undated) Box 125, Jackson MSS, LC
("Wickard draft I") (copy on file with author); Opinion draft, Wickard v Filburn, No 1080 (May
22,1942), Box 125, Jackson MSS, LC ("Wickard draft II") (copy on file with author).
228 Wickard draft I at 3 (cited in note 227).
229 Wickard draft II at 7 (cited in note 227).
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will be forced into the market as a feed buyer and thereby help
swell the volume and sustain prices of the interstate market, or
perhaps we should as reasonably assume that he will be forced
into the market as a livestock seller. So, also, might we assume
that if he and his family are forbidden to eat his home-grown
wheat, he might be forced into the market as a buyer of wheat
products or perhaps we should as reasonably expect him to turn
for sustenance to other products. 2
This, of course, was the rationale upon which a unanimous Court
would ultimately uphold the penalty. But in the spring of 1942 there
was not yet even a majority that was prepared to embrace it.
"Whether the production of wheat for consumption on the farm does
have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce by taking such a
producer out of the consumer market or by the possibility that the
wheat so produced may actually be put upon the market directly or by
sale of stock to which it is fed," Jackson wrote, "are far from clear on
the record and the legislative history presented."23 ' "[T]he stipulated
evidence in the record-the only general evidence in the case-
touches upon it in only the most general sort of way."' And more than
theoretical economic speculation was required. "To establish the
power of Congress over intrastate activity it is of course not sufficient
simply to spell out some plausible relationship between such activity
and interstate commerce."' Instead, empirical verification was essen-
tial: "The power to enter upon the state domain is justified only by a
state of facts showing that the intrastate activities sought to be reached
are of such quality and substantiality that what would otherwise be an
intrusion is proper for the protection and effective exercise of a
granted federal power."'3 In Chicago Board of Trade v Olsen,35 for ex-
ample, "It was shown that [intrastate transactions in grain futures] had
as a matter of fact exercised great influence upon the price of grain
moving in interstate commerce. ' ' 6 As Jackson wrote to Chief Justice
Stone,
230 Id at 12. The first draft had outlined the theory in more rudimentary form: "It is of
course true that if the farmer is not permitted to feed his own produce to his livestock, he may be
forced into the market as a buyer of produce in order to promote the produce market; or he may
be forced into the market as a seller of his livestock. And if forbidden to eat his wheat, so also
may he turn for sustenance to corn pone, grits or hominy." But here again Jackson had rejected
this contention due to inadequate empirical support. Wickard draft I at 3 (cited in note 227).
231 Wickard draft II at 12 (cited in note 227).
232 Id.
233 Id at 9-10.
234 Id at 11-12 (emphasis added).
235 262 US 1 (1923) (holding that the Board of Trade was in the stream of interstate com-
merce):
236 Wickard draft II at 10 (cited in note 227) (emphasis added).
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The Constitution drew a line between state and federal power
and here the Congress wants to cross that line admittedly. I sup-
pose that before we give it our approval there must be some find-
ing that it is warranted by facts and conditions. Otherwise, the
federal compact was pretty meaningless if Congress is to be sole
judge of the extent of its own commerce power. As you have well
pointed out in the Darby case, sometimes the Court has been re-
quired to determine the facts that carry federal power across the
line; sometimes administrative bodies do it; sometimes Congress
has done it-but only, I think, where the effect was obvious to the
naked judicial eye.2
Jackson thus insisted that it was "the function of the courts to de-
termine whether the particular activity regulated or prohibited is
within the reach of federal power."2 The legislative history and the
facts on the record did not demonstrate to Jackson's satisfaction that
the growth of wheat for home consumption had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, and he and his brethren were not prepared to
take the government's word for it.2" The absence of such factual find-
ings, Jackson concluded, "have left us without adequate materials for
confident judgment that an affirmative answer to the question of
power would not 'effectively obliterate the distinction between what is
national [and what is local] and create a completely centralized gov-
ernment.
, ,,0
Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, Murphy, and Byrnes each agreed to
this draft.4' At a subsequent conference, however, the Justices reached
a tentative agreement that the case be set for reargument rather than
remanded,N2 and Jackson prepared an order restoring the case to the
docket for reargument the following October. Moreover, that order
asked for no additional facts to support the contention that Filburn's
activities affected interstate commerce substantially. The case would
now be decided on the existing record, which Jackson and his col-
leagues had so recently found so unilluminating. This decision to order
reargument rather than to remand the case for further factual findings
foretold the abandonment of a court-centered, empirical methodology
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
237 Wickard letter I at 1 (cited in note 225) (emphasis added) (mentioning United States v
Darby, 312 US 100 (1941)).
238 Wickard draft II at 12 (cited in note 227) (emphasis added).
239 Id.
240 Id at 13 (alteration added) (citing Jones & Laughlin, 301 US at 1).
241 Justice Reed asked to be disqualified. See returns of Wickard draft II.
242 Memorandum in Re: No 1080-Wickard v Filburn, Box 125, Jackson MSS, LC (copy on
file with author).
243 Robert H. Jackson, Memorandum for the Members of the Court, Re: No 1080-Wickard
v Filburn (undated), Box 125, Jackson MSS, LC (copy on file with author).
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That summer Jackson wrote two memoranda to his law clerk in
which he worked his way through the Commerce Clause issue pre-
sented. Under these circumstances, wrote Jackson, there were three
possible holdings. First, the Court might hold that "production and
consumption not for commerce is exclusively within the control of the
state."'2 " That, he observed, would have been consistent with the "for-
malistic" Knight line of cases. Second, the Court might hold that local
production "is normally within the control of the state but is trans-
ferred to federal control upon judicial findings that it is necessary to
protect exercise of the commerce power."' ' That, he noted, would
have been consistent with such "realistic" cases as Stafford and
Shreveport, which stood for the proposition that "matters normally
within the political domain of the states might be transferred to fed-
eral control because of their economic relationships.""" Indeed, this
appears to have been the theory upon which Jackson and his col-
leagues had in May thought the case should be decided. The difficulty
had been the absence of facts that would have supported such judicial
findings. Jackson's third possible holding, however, was unprece-
dented: "That it is normally within the control of the state but that it is
transferred to federal control upon a mere Congressional assumption
of control." "
Before the Shreveport case was decided, Jackson thought, there
would have been no doubt that the first holding was the appropriate
one.' After all, production was production. But Shreveport had intro-
duced a new approach, "a break with localistic and legalistic thinking,"
admitting economic data as a factor in determining the scope of the
commerce power. " But this approach too had its difficulties: "Eco-
nomic effects are exceedingly difficult to trace beyond immediate ef-
fects."25 "A difficulty which may not have been foreseen in adopting
economic, in addition to legal, standards for the measurement of the
commerce power," wrote Jackson, "grows out of the indefiniteness of
economic lines. The political lines are definitely drawn but economic
lines are not."''  "The same economic forces which made the political
pattern of a subdivided nation inept for regulatory purposes made all
244 Memorandum for Costelloe I at 1 (cited in note 224).
245 Id (emphasis added).
246 Id at 2.
247 Id at 1.
248 Id.
249 Wickard v Filbum, Memorandum by Mr. Justice Jackson, 10 (undated), Box 125, Jackson
MSS, LC ("Memorandum by Jackson") (copy on file with author).
250 Memorandum for Costelloe I at 2 (cited in note 224).
251 Memorandum for Mr. Costelloe, Re Wickard Case, 12 (July 10, 1942), Box 125, Jackson
MSS, LC ("Memorandum for Costelloe II") (copy on file with author).
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boundaries based on economic facts vague and blurred."= Trying to
cabin Shreveport's notion of competition was like trying to nail jelly to
a wall.
The comparatively simple, and perhaps oversimplified, concepts
of the law lose their validity when applied to economic data. It
has been an easy thing to say that the power to regulate com-
merce included the power to protect that commerce against
competition, for the legal concept of competition was a fairly
definite and simple one. But what is competition in an economic
sense? While competition in a legal sense would arise only be-
tween men dealing in the same kind of goods and hence attempt-
ing to fulfill the same customer desires, the economic concept of
competition might be very much broader and more difficult of
ascertainment. In the economic sense, fuel oil competes with coal.
Both are rivals of electricity, and all three of them are competi-
tors with every other commodity in the market for the con-
sumer's dollar.03
The Court's attempts "to ascertain legal standards for weighing eco-
nomic facts and for applying them to the commerce power" had been
"neither consistent nor well defined."' The direct/indirect distinction
employed in Schechter and "again emphasized" in Jones & Laughlin
was a "legal phrase[ ] of limitation" having "almost no value in weigh-
ing economic effects.' 'n5 The Court had yet to formulate a standard
with any "real value..' .
The failure to develop adequate standards for determining the
circumstances under which "local" activities affected interstate com-
merce sufficiently to support federal regulation led Jackson to aban-
don the effort altogether. In light of the complexity of causation in the
modem American economy,2' he saw traditional formulae for distin-
guishing "local" from "national" economic activity as ropes of sand.
"At what point these effects have enough vitality to confer federal ju-
risdiction and at what point they have passed outside it, we have no
252 Id at 13.
253 Id at 12-13.
254 Id at 13. "[Ihe truth is that we have not yet evolved any set judicial standard by which
to determine what effects upon interstate commerce are adequate to confer jurisdiction on the
federal government and what are not." Id at 14.
255 Id at 14-18.
256 Memorandum for Costelloe I at 3 (cited in note 224). See also Memorandum for Costel-
loe H at 13-18 (cited in note 251).
257 "Economic effects seem almost as persistent as physical force which, it is said, once ex-
erted is never lost. An economic impulse continues indefinitely and may be overcome or its iden-
tity lost but it is too illusive and subtle for tracing out in legal proceedings. First impacts shade
off in force as they expand, like the concentric rings caused by throwing a stone in the water."
Memorandum for Costelloe II at 15 (cited in note 251).
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standards to determine, and I am not at all sure of our capacity to in-
vent such a standard that would have any validity upon the immediate
case to which it is applied."z' "In such a state of affairs," he remarked,
"the determination of the limit is not a matter of legal principle, but of
personal opinion; not one of constitutional law, but one of economic
policy.
' '29
It was this realization that led Jackson to turn from his second
possible holding to his third. It was emphatically the duty of the judi-
ciary to say what the law of the Constitution was; but economic policy
was a matter for the legislature, not for the courts. "We have all but
reached an era in the interpretation of the commerce clause of candid
recognition that we have no legal judgment upon economic effects
which we can oppose to the policy judgment made by Congress in leg-
islation,"2' he wrote. "It is perhaps time that we recognize that the in-
troduction of economic determinism into constitutional law of inter-
state commerce marked the end of judicial control of the scope of
federal activity.''n2
Adopting the third alternative had the virtue of making this and
all future commerce power cases easy. Neither additional factual in-
formation, nor a standard by which to evaluate it, nor its evaluation
under such a standard was any longer necessary. The fact that Con-
gress had enacted the statute was alone sufficient proof of its constitu-
tionality.
Congress has seen fit to regulate small and casual wheat growers
in the interest of large and specialized ones. It has seen fit to ex-
tend its regulation to the grower of wheat for home consumption.
Whether this is necessary, whether it is just, whether it is wise, is
not for us to say. We cannot say that there is no economic rela-
tionship between the growth of wheat for home consumption and
interstate commerce in wheat. As to the weight to be given the
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 "All of this raises seriously the question whether the extent of power under the com-
merce clause is appropriate for judicial decision and brings us to the question of whether Con-
gress by determining what is 'appropriate' to its own regulatory schemes may in effect define the
extent of its own power under the commerce clause" Memorandum for Costelloe I at 3 (cited in
note 224).
261 Memorandum for Costelloe II at 15 (cited in note 251). "Once breaking away from a le-
galistic interpretation of the Constitution and adopting an economic basis, it becomes impossible
for this Court to maintain a position that a subject which Congress and the President regard as
appropriate for regulation is not in fact appropriate, or that one where Congress and a President
perceive a relationship and an effect is in fact nonexistent." Id at 17.
262 Memorandum for Costelloe I at 6 (cited in note 224).
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effects, we have no legal standards by which to set our own
judgment against the policy judgment of Congress.
Paraphrasing a famous remark that Chief Justice Hughes had made
while Governor of New York, Jackson maintained that Filburn's
growth of wheat for home consumption "is within the federal power
to regulate interstate commerce, if for no better reason than that the
commerce clause is what the Congress says it is."' That may have
been "pragmatic," but it certainly was not "empiric."
Jackson's opinion for a unanimous Court did offer an extended
presentation of data concerning the economics of the worldwide
wheat market.2m But these data were not the fruits of any additional
empirical work by the parties or the Court. They were drawn from the
stipulation of facts that the parties had filed before the first argument,
and were contained in the record that Jackson's May draft opinions
had found so unsatisfying. Moreover, as Jackson had noted in his May
drafts, these data were only vaguely relevant to the issue facing the
Court: the effect of growth of wheat for home consumption on inter-
state commerce in wheat. And now the mode of analysis Jackson had
rejected in May because it lacked adequate support in the record be-
came the theory on which the opinion turned. Growth of wheat for
home consumption, Jackson explained, reduced the demand for wheat
sold in interstate commerce and thereby reduced the price at which
such wheat was sold. Because Congress was empowered to regulate
the prices at which goods were sold in interstate commerce, it could
regulate those activities that affected such prices. Though Filburn's
wheat-growing activities taken alone might have little or no effect on
the price of wheat, his activities, "taken together with that of many
others similarly situated,"2 ' might have a substantial effect.
Did the record support judicial findings of such an effect? Here
Jackson finessed the issue. "This record," he wrote, "leaves us in no
doubt that Congress may properly have considered that wheat con-
sumed on the farm where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of regu-
lation, would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its
purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased prices."' 7 The record
did not leave the Court with no doubt that wheat consumed on the
farm did in fact have such an effect-Jackson had expressed just such
doubts for a majority of his colleagues in his May drafts. However, the
263 Memorandum for Costelloe II at 20 (cited in note 251). "Congress has said that [growth
of wheat for home consumption] ... is [ ] appropriate to regulation, and the Court is without
power to gainsay this Congressional determination." Id at 22.
264 Id at 22.
265 Wickard, 317 US at 125-27.
266 Id at 127-28.
267 Id at 128-29.
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record did leave the Justices with no doubt that "Congress may prop-
erly have considered" that it would have such an effect. In other
words, a record that had been utterly inadequate for an empirical, ju-
dicial assessment of the effect was perfectly adequate for a legislative
determination. The Court was no longer independently passing on
whether Congress's determination was correct; it was merely finding
that what Congress had "considered" was "proper." Indeed, a close
reading of the Wickard opinion leaves one in doubt whether the Court
really articulated any judicially enforceable test of the commerce
power at all.2
This conclusion is reinforced by the wording of a memorandum
that Jackson circulated among the Justices. Referring to "the presump-
tion of constitutionality which is raised by Congressional action," ''
Jackson wrote:
We cannot say from anything in this record that the effect on
commerce from the multiplication of individually trifling growers
of wheat for home consumption is not substantial.
[W]e ground our decision on the realities disclosed, which afford
no basis for judicial denial to Congress of the power to extend its
regulation to the production of wheat not intended for commerce
or sale.m
Nowhere did Jackson explain or even suggest what would have af-
forded a basis for such a judicial denial. The presumption of constitu-
tionality embraced by Jackson appeared to place upon the party chal-
lenging the statute the burden of proving that the activity regulated
produced in the aggregate no substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. As proof of such a negative would be virtually impossible, the
presumption of constitutionality was effectively conclusive. Congress
became both the primary and the final judge of the statute's constitu-
tionality.
Consider finally a letter in which Jackson attempted to explain
the Court's decision to his friend Sherman Minton. "I really know of
no place," Jackson confessed, "where we can bound the doctrine of
competition as expounded in the Shreveport, the Wrightwood, and the
Wickard cases. I suppose that soy beans compete with wheat, and
buckwheat competes with soy beans, and a man who spends his
money for corn liquor affects the interstate commerce in corn because
268 See Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 220-22 (cited in note 178).
269 Memorandum by Jackson at 10 (cited in note 249).
270 Id at 12-13.
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he withdraws that much purchasing power from that market."'2" And
so the jig was up. "If we were to be brutally frank," he wrote, "I sus-
pect what we would say is that in any case where Congress thinks
there is an effect on interstate commerce, the Court will accept that
judgment. All of the efforts to set up formulae to confine the com-
merce power have failed. When we admit that it is an economic mat-
ter, we pretty nearly admit that it is not a matter which courts may
judge."'
The Court would continue to judge the impact of state and local
regulations on interstate commerce, however. The national political
process was, in Jackson's view, sufficient to safeguard the states from
congressional overreaching.m But the political process was not suffi-
cient where state or local legislation was at issue. As Justice Stone had
put it in South Carolina Highway Department v Barnwell Brothers:
7
State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose
or effect is to gain for those within the state an advantage at the
expense of those without, or to burden those out of the state
without any corresponding advantage to those within, have been
thought to impinge upon the constitutional prohibition even
though Congress has not acted.... Underlying the stated rule has
been the thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, that when
the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls princi-
pally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely
to be subjected to those political constraints which are normally
exerted on legislation where it adversely affects some interests
within the state.2
271 Robert H. Jackson to Sherman Minton 1-2, (Dec 21,1942), Box 125, Jackson MSS, LC
272 Id at 1.
Z73 As he wrote privately to his clerk,
The same people elect the state and the federal officers. The interests represented by the
two are the same. The people can punish excess or irresponsibility in the use of the com-
merce power by Congressmen. It does not seem likely that the people would send men to
Washington to take away powers which they elect state officers to exercise.
Federal power can, of course, discredit itself by attempting more than is just or can break
down attempting more than it has capacity to organize or administer. Its excesses and irre-
sponsibilities it must answer for at the polls.
Memorandum for Costelloe I at 6-7 (cited in note 224).
274 303 US 177 (1938).
275 Id at 184-85 n 2. Of course, as Stone noted, the redress need not come from the state leg-
islature: "Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate interstate commerce, may de-
termine whether the burdens imposed on it by state regulation, otherwise permissible, are too
great, and may, by legislation designed to secure uniformity or in other respects to protect the
national interest in commerce, curtail to some extent the state's regulatory power." Id at 189-90.
Jackson, who remained skeptical of the prospects for congressional intervention, defended con-
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Just as the Court continued throughout the late 1930s to uphold
federal regulation of activities having a "direct effect upon interstate
and foreign commerce,"' so the Justices continued to assess the con-
stitutionality of state legislation by determining whether it affected in-
terstate commerce only "incidentally or indirectly."m But once
Wickard abandoned direct and indirect effects as analytic categories in
the autumn of 1942," their retention in dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence became anomalous. If "direct" and "indirect" were un-
satisfactory descriptions of the effects of activities on interstate com-
merce, then surely they were equally unsatisfactory descriptions of the
effects of state and local regulations upon such commerce.
Moreover, Wickard created even larger problems for dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Local activities such as production
had previously affected interstate commerce only "indirectly," and had
accordingly been subject to state and local regulation. Now, to use the
older vocabulary, even those activities affected interstate commerce
sufficiently "directly" to warrant federal regulation. State and local
regulation of those activities would now presumably affect interstate
commerce "directly" as well. But state and local regulations affecting
such commerce "directly" had long been held to transgress the im-
plicit limitations of the Commerce Clause. Were the growth of federal
power not to obliterate state and local regulatory authority by impli-
cation, dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence would have to be
placed upon a new footing. It would have to be decoupled from its af-
firmative counterpart, to abandon the categories the two had shared,
and regulatory authority over such matters would have to become
concurrent.
This is precisely what happened later that same term in Parker v
Brown."' The case involved provisions of the California Agricultural
Prorate Act regulating contracts between raisin producers and local
processors. Chief Justice Stone, who had earlier criticized the di-
rect/indirect distinction in a case involving foreign commerce, wrote
the opinion sustaining the regulation against a dormant Commerce
tinued judicial scrutiny. State and local restraints on interstate commerce, he wrote, were "indi-
vidually too petty, too diversified, and too local to get the attention of a Congress hard pressed
with more urgent matters." Duckworth v Arkansas, 314 US 390,400 (1941) (Jackson concurring).
276 Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co v NLRB, 303 US 453,469 (1938) (permitting regulation of
labor dispute regarding workers in shipping industry).
277 Milk Control Board v Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 US 346,351 (1939) (upholding state
regulation of prices paid to milk producers by in-state dealers).
278 317 US at 124-25.
279 317 US 341 (1943).
280 See Di Santo v Pennsylvania, 273 US 34, 43-45 (1927) (Stone dissenting) (arguing
against the invalidation of a state law requiring agents selling tickets for foreign boat travel to
obtain licenses from the state).
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Clause challenge. Stone noted that the regulation could have been sus-
tained employing conventional analysis:
This distinction between local regulation of those who are not
engaged in commerce, although the commodity which they pro-
duce and sell to local buyers is ultimately destined for interstate
commerce, and the regulation of those who engage in the com-
merce by selling the product interstate, has in general served, and
serves here, as a ready means of distinguishing those local activi-
ties which, under the Commerce Clause, are the appropriate sub-
ject of state regulation despite their effect on interstate com-
merce.
"But," Stone continued,
[Clourts ar not confined to so mechanical a test. When Congress
has not exerted its power under the Commerce Clause, and state
regulation of matters of local concern is so related to interstate
commerce that it also operates as a regulation of that commerce,
the reconciliation of the power thus granted with that reserved to
the state is to be attained by the accommodation of the compet-
ing demands of the state and national interests involved.
Such regulations by the state are to be sustained, not because
they are "indirect" rather than "direct" [citing Wickard], not be-
cause they control interstate activities in such a manner as only
to affect the commerce rather than to command its operations.
But they are to be upheld because upon a consideration of all the
relevant facts and circumstances it appears that the matter is one
which may appropriately be regulated in the interest of the
safety, health and well-being of local communities, and which, be-
cause of its local character, and the practical difficulties involved,
may never be adequately dealt with by Congress.m
This extension of the Cooleym rule of concurrent jurisdiction to
previously "purely local" activities, with its emphasis on "balancing"
"the relative weights of the conflicting local and national interests in-
volved,'2 would supply the standard mode of analyzing nondiscrimi-
natory state and local regulations for the remainder of the century.'
281 Parker, 317 US at 362.
2 Id at 362-63 (citations omitted).
2 See text accompanying notes 120-22.
284 Parker, 317 US at 367.
M See, for example, Pike v Bruce Church, Inc, 397 US 137, 142 (1970) (invalidating state
law requiring processing of produce in-state because state interests were outweighed by burden
on interstate commerce); Southern Pacific Co vArizona, 325 US 761,783 (1945) (holding that the
national interest in uniform train regulations outweighs state safety interests in the lengths of
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As for the affirmative Commerce Clause, the relentless pursuit of
the logic of realism had, in dialectical fashion, pointed the Court to-
ward a new kind of formalism. If the matter was "economic," Jackson
had written, then it was within Congress's power to regulate. The
negative pregnant lay dormant for fifty-three years. But when Con-
gress sought to criminalize local possession of a firearm in a school
zone, the Lopez majority (almost certainly unwittingly) let fall the
other shoe, distinguished "commercial" from "noncommercial" activ-
ity, and revived slumbering restraints on the commerce power.-
CONCLUSION
Doctrinal development does not proceed topically; it proceeds
synchronically. The Justices of this era did not first decide all of its af-
firmative Commerce Clause cases, then move on to all of its dormant
Commerce Clause cases, and only then to its substantive due process
cases. The doctrinal decontextualization involved in the conventional
strategy of studying a line of doctrine from its earliest expression
through its most recent is thus fundamentally misguided. The anach-
ronism of studying doctrinal development through the categories
comprising the modem constitutional sensibility only compounds the
error. Such an approach too easily blinds us to the dynamics of inter-
doctrinal connections and the mechanics of interdoctrinal coordina-
tion that characterized the jurisprudence of an earlier age." Left with
such an anemic account of the Justices' intellectual enterprise, we are
all the more easily seduced by uncharitable or even cynical and dis-
missive interpretations of their capacities and motivations.m
But such interpretations are too facile. The Court did not enter
the Depression decade flanked by two horses saddled and ready to
ride."" Instead the Justices rode into the 1930s on one three-
dimensional jurisprudential steed, which offered different appear-
ances when viewed from various points of vantage: flexibly "realistic"
from one angle, unthinkingly "formalistic" from another, but never
trains).
286 United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 561 (1995) (invalidating as exceeding Congress's
commerce power a federal criminal statute having "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of
economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms").
287 A promising start on a synchronic approach has been made by Paul Brest and Sanford
Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials (Little, Brown 3d ed
1992), though the authors could do considerably more to identify the sinews that held various
doctrines together as a jurisprudential body. For an earlier synchronic presentation with a pau-
city of connective tissue, see John B. Sholley, Cases on Constitutional Law (Bobbs-Merrill 1951).
288 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and
Change xii (Chicago 1977) (explaining that scholars should focus on the best or most sensible
reading of historical texts).
289 See Corwin, Commerce Power at 167 (cited in note 5).
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fully either. "Formalism" was suffused with "realism," while "realism"
was constrained by "formalism."
After Nebbia, however, the center would not hold. The conse-
quences of the Nebbia-Shreveport conjunction, pursued to their logical
end, produced the irony that the very embrace of realism led inevita-
bly to its abandonment as a judicial methodology in Commerce
Clause cases. For where one's major premise was that every economic
activity when aggregated affected commerce substantially, there was
no need to undertake a practical, realistic examination of the facts in
any particular case. Universal conclusions flowed from universal
premises. The Court's decision to abandon judicially-enforced limita-
tions on the commerce power in Wickard v Filburn was thus not sim-
ply an election to saddle up young, vigorous Realism rather than old,
worn-out Formalism. It was instead a determination to dismount this
particular high horse altogether, only to mount another more suited to
the spirit of the age.290
290 I refer here of course to the heightened solicitude for civil rights and civil liberties both
described and heralded in the famous footnote four of United States v Carolene Products Co, 304
US 144,153 n 4 (1938).
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